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The perception that biosecurity import restrictions are used as disguised 
barriers to trade is widespread.  Despite this perception, there has been little empirical 
analysis distinguishing genuine attempts to protect against introductions of foreign 
pests and diseases from attempts to distort trade.  In this dissertation, I examine the 
extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity import standard – US agricultural border 
inspections for non-indigenous species (NIS) – is used as a disguised barrier to trade.  
I develop a theoretical model of border inspections that incorporates incentives to 
protect domestic agricultural producers from import competition as well as incentives 
to protect against NIS damage associated with agricultural imports.  The theoretical 
model is used to specify an econometric model of border inspection that identifies a 
parameter representing the implied weight the inspection agency places on domestic 
producer welfare relative to consumer welfare.  The structural model further identifies 
a parameter representing expected NIS damage as implied by the inspection agency’s 
  
choice of inspection intensity.  I estimate the parameters of the model using a dataset 
that documents the outcome of US agricultural border inspections.   
I find evidence suggesting that the inspection agency places greater weight on 
domestic producer welfare relative to consumer welfare, independent of expected NIS 
damage.  Estimates of the implicit weight on domestic producer surplus range from 1 
to 1.63.  These results suggest that inspection protocols are implemented in a trade 
distorting manner to the benefit of domestic producers and at the expense of domestic 
consumers.  I also find evidence that border inspections are influenced by terms of 
trade motives.  The evidence that inspections are not implemented in a least trade 
distorting manner is independent of expected NIS damage.  A second outcome of the 
econometric analysis is an estimate of expected NIS damage: I find that the 
inspection agency behaves as if expected NIS damage ranges from $0 to more than 
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1. Introduction and Policy Background 
 
New introductions of foreign pests and diseases threaten the productivity of 
agricultural resources, compromise human health, and threaten the viability of natural 
ecosystems (Vitousek et al. 1997; Mumford 2002).  The predominant pathway of new 
pest and disease introductions is international trade in agricultural commodities (OTA 
1993; NRC 2002; Perrings et al. 2005).  The use of biosecurity restrictions on 
agricultural imports – typically enforced by screening potentially contaminated 
imports at border crossings and ports of entry – has a long history.1  Recently, the 
emergence of a number of high profile biosecurity issues has increased scrutiny of 
import standards and their enforcement (Waage and Mumford 2008).  These 
measures are often contentious issues in international trade.  Uncertainty over 
potential damage due to foreign pest and disease introductions, combined with a lack 
of transparency in enforcement, provides government agencies with an avenue to 
manipulate pre-emptive policy for protectionist purposes.  Recognizing the potential 
for misuse of border inspections, international trade agreements prohibit the use of 
border inspections as arbitrary or unjustified barriers to trade (Smith 2003). 
Regulatory capture of government agencies by domestic producer groups is 
often suspected to result in excessive use of biosecurity trade restrictions (Josling, 
Roberts, and Orden 2004).  Despite the suspicion of disguised protectionism, little 
systematic empirical analysis exists that distinguishes genuine attempts to protect 
                                                 
1 Germany was the first to introduce significant pest legislation in 1875 in response to introduction of 
the Colorado potato beetle.  England followed in 1877 with passage of the Destructive Insects Act.  In 
the US, the first quarantine and destruction legislation was introduced in Massachusetts in 1859.  The 
first federal quarantine was implemented in 1879 when US customs collectors imposed a ninety day 
quarantine on imports of European cattle (Kreith and Golino 2003). 
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against foreign pests and diseases from attempts to protect domestic producers from 
import competition.  Distinguishing these two motives requires knowledge of 
expected damages as well as an assessment of risk preferences and regulatory 
approaches to risk which often vary across nations and regulatory agencies (Sumner 
and Tangermann 2002; Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer 2005).  In addition, 
heterogeneity in standards and a lack of systematic data make quantification of the 
restrictiveness of import standards difficult (Beghin 2008; Beghin and Bureau 2001).  
Empirical analysis is further complicated due to the fact that the actual degree of 
enforcement is often imperfect and unobserved.   
In this dissertation, I examine the extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity 
import standard – US agricultural border inspections for non-indigenous species 
(NIS) – is used as a disguised barrier to trade.  In Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical 
model of border inspections that incorporates incentives to protect domestic 
agricultural producers from import competition as well as incentives to mitigate NIS 
damage associated with agricultural imports.  Reduced form and structural models – 
guided by the theory presented in Chapter 2 – of US agricultural border inspections 
for NIS are presented in Chapter 3.  The reduced form model examines the 
relationship between the observed variables in the model; the impact of the standard 
political economy variable (the inverse import penetration ratio) on inspection 
intensity is of particular interest.  The structural model incorporates terms of trade 
motives and identifies a parameter representing the implied weight the inspection 
agency places on domestic producer welfare relative to domestic consumer welfare.  
The structural model further identifies a parameter representing expected NIS damage 
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as implied by the inspection agency’s choice of inspection intensity.  The parameters 
of the model are estimated using a dataset that documents the outcome of US 
agricultural border inspections for fiscal years 2005 thru 2007.  The data is described 
in Chapter 4.   
Results of the econometric analyses are presented in Chapter 5.  In the 
structural analysis, I find evidence suggesting that the inspection agency places 
greater weight on domestic producer welfare relative to domestic consumer welfare 
(and other components of social welfare), independent of expected NIS damage.  The 
estimated weight on domestic producer surplus ranges from 1 to 1.63, implying 
domestic consumer welfare is valued at between 61 and 100 percent of domestic 
producer welfare.  I also find that terms of trade are an important determinant of 
border inspections for a number of the commodities in the analysis.  Together, these 
results suggest that inspection protocols are implemented in a trade distorting manner 
to the benefit of domestic producers and at the expense of domestic consumers.  A 
second outcome of the structural analysis is an estimate of expected NIS damage: I 
find that the inspection agency behaves as if expected NIS damage ranges from $0 to 
more than $0.25 per dollar of inspected imports depending on commodity and the 
season of import.  Further, the results of the reduced form analysis support the 
validity of the structural model. 
The analysis presented in this dissertation contributes to three distinct 
literatures.  Previous empirical trade research presents evidence that politically 
influential domestic production sectors are able to secure favorable trade policies 
(Trefler 1993; Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Lopez 
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and Matschke 2006).  In recent research, Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) relax 
the small country assumption typically made in this literature and test for the 
importance of terms of trade motives.  They present evidence that both terms of trade 
and political economy motives are important determinants of US non-tariff barriers.  
The frameworks motivating these analyses are often based on theoretical models of 
tariff formation, whereas the empirical analyses assess the determinants of aggregate 
measures of non-tariff barriers (Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay 2000).  I extend this literature by focusing on a specific non-tariff 
barrier in a setting where trade agreements constrain the use of tariffs.  I also maintain 
a tight link between the theoretical model and the empirical analysis.   
The empirical trade literature has focused on non-tariff barriers implemented 
with the clear intent of restricting trade.  A related literature examines agricultural 
non-tariff barriers ostensibly implemented to mitigate sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) threats.  This literature evaluates the welfare consequences of relaxing SPS 
import standards; evidence of an overly restrictive import standard is based on an 
assessment of the social welfare consequences of removing the standard, net of 
expected damage in absence of the standard (see Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004 for 
a survey).  In some cases, the cost of SPS trade restrictions to domestic consumers 
outweighs potential damage due to the foreign pest or disease.  For example, Peterson 
and Orden (2008) demonstrate that, given reasonable assumptions about the risk of 
pest infestation, removal of certain US phytosanitary restrictions on avocado imports 
from Mexico increases US welfare.  An implicit assumption in much of this literature 
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is that standards are perfectly enforced, which may not always be the case.2  I relax 
this assumption and directly examine enforcement of an SPS import standard.     
Finally, this dissertation builds on previous theoretical models of trade and 
NIS (see Costello, Lawley, and McAusland 2009 for a survey of pre-emptive NIS 
trade policy).  McAusland and Costello (2004) examine enforcement of a standard 
restricting trade in potentially contaminated imports.  Assuming border inspections 
are imperfect and costly, McAusland and Costello (2004) demonstrate that the 
optimal import tariff is strictly positive in the presence of NIS risk.  This result is 
independent of political economy, economies of scale, and terms of trade 
motivations.3  In a political economy model of border inspections and fines, Margolis 
and Shogren (2007) demonstrate that an increase in inspection stringency due to a 
constraint on the use of tariffs may result in an effective level of protection greater 
than the level of protection initially provided by an unconstrained tariff.4   
I build on prior models of border inspection for NIS in a number of ways.  
First, I include a domestic production sector, assigning a welfare weight to domestic 
producer surplus that captures the implicit weight the inspection agency places on 
domestic producer surplus relative to other components of social welfare.  Second, in 
contrast to prior border inspection models, the theory I develop allows the world price 
to respond to border inspection stringency, provided the importing country is 
                                                 
2 For example, despite an import ban on Argentinean beef, weak border controls led to periodic 
outbursts of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Chile (Fischer and Serra 2000).   
3 In an extension of the McAusland and Costello (2004) model, Merel and Carter (2008) demonstrate 
the efficiency gains of a two part tariff which consists of a uniform import tariff and a fine on detected 
contaminated imports.  Ameden, Cash, and Zilberman (2007) examine exporter response to NIS border 
enforcement in a model with inspection and fines. 
4 Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer (2005) incorporate political economy motives into a model of tariffs 
and NIS.  They show that the marginal expected damage due to NIS is incorporated into the politically 
optimal tariff rate.   
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sufficiently large.5  Third, I use a more general specification of detections than has 
been used in the existing border inspection literature.  Fourth, to maintain consistency 
with the disposition of contaminated agricultural commodities in the US, I assume 
detected imports are treated rather than destroyed.   
 
1.1 Policy Background 
1.1.1 Institutional History  
Inspection of US agricultural imports were initiated in 1881 and the first 
recorded interception occurred in California in 1891 on a shipment of orange trees 
from Tahiti (Kreith and Golino 2003).  Federally, the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) began inspecting imported agricultural commodities, primarily 
nursery stock in 1913, under the authority of the 1912 Plant Quarantine Act (GAO 
2006).  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) was established in 
1972, assuming responsibility for various plant and animal health services from the 
USDA.  The plant and animal inspection divisions were merged in 1974 with the 
creation of the Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) division of APHIS.  Beginning 
in the early 1990s, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program gave 
APHIS responsibility for inspection of imported agricultural commodities.  The 2000 
Plant Protection Act consolidated a number of plant protection statutes, including the 
Plant Quarantine Act.  
                                                 
5 Margolis and Shogren (2007) explicitly model a political economy mechanism by incorporating the 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of trade policy and campaign contributions into a model of 
border inspections.  Batabyal and Beladi (2009) incorporate a number of alternative market structures, 
including the case of a large importing country, into a model of tariffs and NIS. 
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Prior to formation of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), US inspection services were performed by three 
separate federal agencies; APHIS was responsible for preventing the entry of pests 
and diseases through the AQI activities of PPQ; the US Customs Service was 
responsible for collecting import duties, enforcing anti-smuggling laws, and 
preventing entry of narcotics and drugs; and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service was responsible for inspecting foreign visitors to prevent illegal entry into the 
US.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for all three 
inspection services to the newly formed CBP division of the DHS (GAO 2006).  
Despite previous concerns regarding the adequacy of agricultural inspections as 
administered by APHIS, environmental and agricultural groups opposed the transfer 
due to a concern that agricultural inspections would receive lower priority relative to 
the other border security responsibilities assigned to CBP (Rawson 2002).  
Agricultural and environmental groups have continued to press members of Congress 
to return responsibility for agricultural border inspections to APHIS (Campbell 2007). 
In March 2003, more than 1,800 agricultural inspection specialists employed 
by APHIS were transferred to CBP.  Subsequently, CBP has hired more than 630 
additional agricultural specialists.  Despite increased staffing levels, concern remains 
that CBP has not developed a risk-based staffing model (GAO 2006).  Further, as of 
2005 there was a perception among USDA and DHS officials that there was a 
shortage of agricultural inspectors nationwide (GAO 2006).  Since the transfer to 
CBP in March 2003, officials with the DHS have acknowledged that the frequency of 
agricultural inspections declined overall.  Nonetheless, inspections increased at some 
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ports, and in particular inspections at land border crossings increased by six percent 
between 2002 and 2004 (GAO 2006).6      
 
1.1.2 Inspection Protocols  
Although CBP has responsibility for physically inspecting non-propagative 
agricultural imports, APHIS maintains responsibility for designing inspection 
protocols and training inspection staff.  APHIS has the authority to regulate US fruit 
and vegetable imports under Quarantine 56 (Title 7 Code of Federal Regulations 
§319.56) and the Plant Protection Act.  Under this authority, all imports of fruits and 
vegetables arriving at ports of entry and border crossings may be physically 
inspected.  APHIS maintains a list of ‘actionable’ pests currently not established in 
the US that would cause significant economic harm to domestic agro-ecosystems or 
natural ecosystems upon establishment.7   
Commodities imported under pre-clearance or precautionary treatment 
programs are subject to specific inspection procedures.  The National Agricultural 
Release Program (NARP) (which replaced the Border Cargo Release Program) has 
been established for a number of low-risk, high-volume commodities imported 
primarily from Mexico.  Commodities entering under pre-clearance programs, 
precautionary treatment programs, and the NARP are subject to less frequent physical 
inspection.   
                                                 
6 These figures are based on inspection data recorded in the Work Accomplishment Data System 
(WADS) maintained by APHIS.  The accuracy of WADS data has been questioned by APHIS officials 
in the past since these statistics are often based on estimates of activity rather than real-time 
information (GAO 1997). 
7 Between 1984 and 2001, APHIS intercepted approximately 42,000 actionable pests per year 
(McCullough et al. 2006).   
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Steps in the inspection process are detailed in the Fruit and Vegetable Import 
Manual maintained by APHIS.8  The inspection process begins with collection and 
review of documents accompanying individual consignments.  At this point 
inspectors determine whether or not the consignment fits into a special category, such 
as pre-clearance or precautionary treatment programs, or whether or not the 
consignment is in-transit to another country.  All consignments of fresh fruits and 
vegetables require an import permit specific to each commodity – commingled 
unauthorized commodities must be segregated from authorized commodities.   
Among those imports selected for a physical inspection, inspection protocols 
suggests a representative sample of roughly two percent, by volume (NRC 2002; 
Venette, Moon, and Hutchinson 2002; Work et al. 2005).  Inspection involves 
offloading the commodity, removing items from containers, and physical inspection 
which may consist of visual examination, dissection, and the “beat technique” 
(Venette, Moon, and Hutchinson 2002).  The exporter is responsible for supplying the 
labor to move, open, and repackage sampled containers or boxes.  Inspectors look for 
evidence of insects, mites, mollusks, nematodes, noxious weeds, and pathogens.  
There are special procedures for inspecting certain fruits and vegetables from specific 
countries of origin, such as apples, citrus, pears, grapes, and stone fruit from South 
Africa, apples and pears from Australia or New Zealand, and apples and pears from 
Chile.  Avocados from Michoacan, Mexico, clementines from Spain, kiwi from New 
Zealand, and pears from China all have specific sampling procedures.   
                                                 




Inspection protocols also vary by broad groups of commodities, irrespective 
of the country of origin.  Fleshy or pulpy fruits and vegetables are inspected on the 
surface for pests or indications of pests boring and feeding.  These fruits or vegetables 
may also be dissected to look for insect larvae and other pests – for example, fresh 
peppers must be examined both internally and externally.  Leafy vegetables are 
inspected for the presence of mollusks, insect larvae, and signs of insect larvae which 
involves dissecting the leaf.  Legumes, such as fresh beans and peas, are examined for 
holes bored in the pods and seeds, which provide evidence of the presence of larvae 
and adult insects.  Discoloration, surface irregularities, and malformed pods are used 
as indicators of diseased legumes.  Finally, roots crops are examined for signs of 
insect boring – if bored holes are found the root is dissected to look for the presence 
of pests.  Surface discolorations, blisters, and depressions indicate potential presence 
of nematodes.  Detection of nematodes requires a physical examination of a cross 
section of the root vegetable.   
In the final stage of the inspection process regulatory action is initiated based 
on the outcome of inspection results.  If an actionable pest is not discovered during 
the course of inspection, the consignment is released.  If a pest is discovered, a 
determination of the actionable status of the pest is made.  Inspectors with authority 
to identify certain pests or pathogens determine actionable status.  However, 
inspectors may lack identification authority for certain pests or pathogens, in which 
case the consignment is placed on hold and the intercepted specimen or a digital 
image of the specimen is sent for identification (typically sent to systematics 
scientists with the USDA’s Beltsville Agricultural Research Center located in 
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Beltsville, Maryland or the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History in Washington 
D.C.).   
If a detected pest is determined to be actionable, the contaminated 
consignment is subject to regulatory action prior to entry into the US.  Contaminated 
imports may be destroyed, re-exported to an alternative country, or treated according 
to a treatment approved by APHIS (typically fumigation by methyl bromide or cold 
treatment).  The majority of non-propagative agricultural commodities are treated.  In 
some cases contaminated imports may not be treated and must be re-exported or 
destroyed.  In other cases, treatable commodities may be destroyed or re-exported 
depending on the relative costs of treating, destroying, and re-exporting.  The 
decision to treat, re-export, or destroy detected contaminated imports therefore 
depends on the condition of the product, the value of the product, and the availability 
of an appropriate treatment technology. 
Despite clear guidelines for inspection protocols, adherence to these protocols 
is variable and this has been the case for some time.  A 1997 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report suggested that weaknesses in the staffing models 
used to allocate inspection resources implied that APHIS had little assurance that it 
was deploying inspection resources efficiently and effectively (GAO 1997).  
Inefficient allocation of resources leads to variation in the number of samples selected 
from inspected cargo as well as variation in the method of obtaining a sample.  The 
use of “tailgate” inspections, where samples are selected on the basis of ease of 
access as opposed to a representative sample, is common (Venette, Moon, and 




1.1.3 US Vegetable Producers and Import Competition 
The empirical component of this dissertation focuses on US border inspection 
of fresh vegetable imports, including tomato, pepper, onion, bean/pea, and 
broccoli/cauliflower, all of which are primarily imported from Mexico.  Import 
competition from Mexico is a particularly contentious issue within the US fruit and 
vegetable sector and trade in these commodities, particularly tomatoes, is subject to a 
number of non-tariff barriers.9  Prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), seasonal tariff rates applied to fruit and vegetable imports were higher 
during US harvest seasons.  Passage of NAFTA was opposed by US fruit and 
vegetable growers due to concerns that the phase-out of seasonal fruit and vegetable 
import tariffs would force US producers to compete directly with cheaper Mexican 
imports (Orden 1996).  Opposition was particularly strong among growers in Florida 
and California; these grower groups pressed for longer transition periods and “snap-
back” provisions to protect against import surges (Avery 1998).  As a part of the 
NAFTA Implementation Act, the US International Trade Commission (USITC) was 
required to monitor imports of fresh tomatoes and peppers for evidence of import 
surges thru January 2009 (USITC 2007).   
US fruit and vegetable imports have increased significantly since passage of 
NAFTA, growing from $2.7 billion in 1990 to $7.9 billion in 2006.  Net vegetable 
                                                 
9 Bredahl, Schmitz, and Hillman (1987) provide a history of US barriers to fruit and vegetable imports.  
Marketing orders for fresh fruit and vegetables typically include minimum quality standards which 
may be used to generate rents for domestic producers at the expense of consumers (Bockstael 1984; 
Bredahl, Schmitz, and Hillman 1987).  Anti-dumping duties have been used to protect US producers of 
tomatoes from Mexican import competition (Baylis and Perloff 2010).     
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imports were $2.25 billion in 2004-06, primarily sourced from NAFTA countries.  
Tomatoes and peppers are the top two fresh vegetable imports.  In addition to overall 
import growth, the import share of domestic consumption has increased for a number 
of vegetable commodities.  Overall, the share of imports in total domestic 
consumption increased from 9.3 percent in 1983-85 to 16.3 percent in 2003-05.  
Between 1993-95 and 2003-05, the import share of US domestic pepper, tomato, and 
green bean consumption increased by 173 percent, 146 percent, and 155 percent 
respectively.  The broccoli/cauliflower import share remains below ten percent, but 
increased by more than 200 percent between 1993-95 and 2003-05.  One exception to 
the trend of increasing import shares is onions; per capita consumption of onions has 
increased, but the import share has remained level due to a corresponding increase in 
domestic production (Huang and Huang 2007).  
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2. Theoretical Model 
  
In this chapter I present a theoretical model of border inspection for NIS.  The 
theoretical model extends the previous literature to include terms of trade and 
political economy considerations in addition to detection of invasive pests as 
motivations influencing the intensity of border inspections.  I begin with a survey of 
the prior theoretical literature evaluating trade and NIS.  That survey is followed by 
presentation and analysis of the model.  I initially assume that both the tariff rate and 
inspection intensity are set jointly to maximize a weighted social welfare function.  I 
then assume that the tariff is predetermined and inspection intensity is the sole policy 
instrument available to the inspection agency.  This chapter concludes with a 
summary of results. 
 
2.1 Prior Literature 
The theoretical literature examining trade barriers implemented to prevent 
introductions of invasive NIS has considered Pigouvian tariffs, mitigation strategies, 
and border inspections.  Political economy and terms of trade motivations have also 
been incorporated into these models.  Paarlberg and Lee (1998) incorporate terms of 
trade motivations into a model of optimal Pigouvian tariffs.  Wilson and Anton 
(2005) extend the Paarlberg and Lee (1998) model to include mitigation strategies.  
McAusland and Costello (2004) present a model of contaminated imports and 
examine the optimal mix of policies, including import tariffs and border inspections.  
Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer (2005) incorporate political economy into a model of 
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Pigouvian tariffs and a working paper by Margolis and Shogren (2007) includes 
political economy in a model of Pigouvian tariffs, border inspections, and fines.  
Merel and Carter (2008) extend the McAusland and Costello (2004) model to allow 
for a two-part tariff that includes a fine on detected contaminated imports. 
Paarlberg and Lee (1998) derive the optimal tariff for a large importing 
country in the presence of foot and mouth disease (FMD) risk.  The optimal tariff is 
comprised of a Pigouvian tariff and the standard optimal tariff due to terms of trade 
motivations.  The Pigouvian tariff equates the marginal cost of an increased domestic 
price with the marginal benefit of reduced risk of FMD infection.  The standard 
optimal tariff component equals the inverse of the export supply elasticity.  Wilson 
and Anton (2005) extend the Paarlberg and Lee (1998) model to allow for mitigation 
strategies, such as vaccination and culling, in addition to an ad valorem tariff.  In both 
of these models, the large importing country can apply different trade policy to 
different trading partners on the basis of FMD risk as well as terms of trade 
considerations.  These models assume that the importer sets its border policy 
unilaterally and foreign retaliation is not considered.  Both papers use simulation 
analysis to evaluate the welfare impacts of different border policies in the presence of 
different levels of FMD risk.    
McAusland and Costello (2004) examine the trade-off between border 
inspections (when detected imports are destroyed, inspection is equivalent to an 
endogenous ‘iceberg’ trade cost) and tariffs in the prevention of unintentional NIS 
introductions.  In the absence of political economy and terms of trade motives and 
under the assumptions that detection is proportional to the detection rate and that 
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shipments containing NIS are destroyed, McAusland and Costello (2004) demonstrate 
that the optimal import tariff is strictly positive even with the option of border 
inspection.  The optimal policy instruments are tied to a number of characteristics of 
the imported goods, including foreign cost of production, the infection rate of 
exported goods, and per-unit damages associated with contaminated exports.  The 
proportion of exported goods contaminated with an invasive NIS is exogenous and 
known with certainty.  Damages are assumed to be a linear function of the number of 
invasive NIS accepted by Home and these damages are known with certainty.10  In 
cases where the infection rate or the foreign cost of production is sufficiently high, it 
is optimal to forego inspections and simply charge the appropriate tariff rate.       
McAusland and Costello (2004) extend their basic model to account for 
exporter efforts to clean goods prior to shipment, thereby treating the infection rate as 
an endogenous variable.  They also extend the model to a two-period dynamic setting 
where the pest population admitted in the first period grows according to a concave 
growth function, essentially introducing a non-linear damage term.  Assuming second 
order conditions are satisfied, inspection intensity is never lower in the dynamic 
versus the static setting, although it may be optimal to set a lower tariff. 
 The McAusland and Costello (2004) model establishes optimal tariff and 
inspection intensity in the presence of NIS risk; both of these policy instruments are 
                                                 
10 I have worked through an extension that incorporates uncertainty regarding the infection rate.  This 
extension tended to make the model intractable.  I have also worked through an extension that allows 
for non-linear damages (a convex general power function).  The comparative static results derived in 
the original McAusland and Costello (2004) model carry through in this extension.  One result 
changes: in the original model it was optimal to not inspect at an infection rate of zero or a very high 
infection rate, whereas if damages are convex there is a low level of infection (greater than zero) for 
which optimal inspection intensity is zero.  I also incorporated uncertainty regarding the per-unit 
damages.  As the variance in per-unit damage increases the optimal response is to increase both 
inspections and tariffs.     
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set independent of political economy and terms of trade motivations.  Margolis, 
Shogren, and Fischer (2005) adapt the Grossman and Helpman (1994) political 
economy model of tariff formation to the issue of NIS and trade.  Their application of 
the Grossman-Helpman model incorporates the marginal damage due to NIS into the 
politically optimal tariff rate.  Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer (2005) conclude that it 
is difficult to separate the contribution of political lobbying versus genuine attempts 
to mitigate NIS risk on the formation of tariff rates.   
Margolis and Shogren (2007) follow up on the Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer 
(2005) paper with another Grossman-Helpman political economy model; in this case 
the government chooses among fines, border inspections, and a tariff.  Margolis and 
Shogren (2007) assume throughout that the importer is a small country, therefore 
ignoring terms of trade considerations.  Inspections are used to intercept contaminated 
imports.  Rather than rejecting or destroying detected imports, a fine is imposed on 
contaminated imports and the goods are admitted.  Margolis and Shogren (2007) 
consider both politically optimal and predetermined tariffs.  They find that an 
increase in inspection intensity due to a reduction in the predetermined tariff rate may 
result in a level of effective protection greater than the level of protection initially 
provided by the predetermined tariff.  
Finally, Merel and Carter (2008) demonstrate the efficiency gains of a two 
part tariff consisting of a uniform import tariff and a fine on detected contaminated 
imports.  The Merel and Carter (2008) model maintains the basic assumptions of the 
McAusland and Costello (2004) model: detected imports are destroyed, the importing 
country is small, there is no domestic production sector, and damage due to NIS is 
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known with certainty.  They consider the case where exporters are able to clean 
shipments prior to export – an endogenous infection rate.  In this model, the optimum 
uniform tariff on exports received is set to recover inspection costs.  The optimal fine 
is applied to detected imports and set at a rate that covers the expected damage due to 
all contaminated imports.  Essentially, the fine is set to penalize contaminated units 
such that exporters have an incentive to engage in pre-export cleaning.  
 
2.2 The Model 
I generalize the McAusland and Costello (2004) model in several ways.  First, 
I include a domestic production sector. The model assigns a welfare weight to 
domestic producer surplus that captures the implicit weight the inspection agency 
places on domestic producer surplus relative to other components of social welfare.  
Second, in contrast to the prior border inspection literature, I incorporate terms of 
trade considerations into the model, implying that the world price responds to border 
inspection stringency provided the importing country is sufficiently large.  Third, I 
use a more general specification of detections as a function of inspection intensity.  
Finally, I assume that detected contaminated imports are treated rather than destroyed 
or re-exported.  In the US the majority of contaminated imports discovered during the 
course of agricultural inspections are treated. 
I model the choice of inspection intensity by a government agency with a 
mandate to inspect imports potentially contaminated with NIS.  Inspection effort is 
chosen to maximize a weighted domestic social welfare function that consists of 
domestic consumer surplus, domestic producer surplus, the cost of border inspections, 
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tariff revenue, and expected damages due to admitted NIS.  The optimal inspection 
intensity balances the direct cost and benefit of border inspections with the indirect 
impact of price changes on different components of the weighted social welfare 
function.     
The importing country imports goods potentially contaminated with damaging 
NIS.  Domestic demand for the good is denoted ( )D p  where p  is the domestic price 
of the good.  The domestic import-competing production sector supplies ( ) 0y p  to 
the Home market.  Net export supply is denoted ( ) 0wx p   where wp  is the world 
price.  Net import demand is the difference between domestic consumption and 
domestic production ( ) ( ) ( ) 0m p D p y p   .   
 NIS damage, which may include damage and control costs associated with 
reduced agricultural productivity as well as impaired ecosystem functioning, is a 
function of the number of NIS admitted into the importing country.  In the absence of 
border inspections the expected number of NIS admitted is determined by the volume 
of exports sent to the importer and the expected rate of infection of those exports, 
denoted q .  Total expected damages are a function of the expected number of pests 
admitted, ( )wqx p , where 0  represents expected damage per admitted pest.11  
The probability that a NIS establishes in the importing country is therefore increasing 
in the expected number of introductions ( )wqx p .  Expected damage per admitted pest 
                                                 
11 In analyses of livestock import protocols implemented to prevent entry of Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD), Paarlberg and Lee (1998) and Wilson and Anton (2005) incorporate damages into the supply 
function of the import-competing sector (the livestock sector).  In this model damages are separable 
from the import-competing domestic production sector.  This reflects the fact that established NIS may 
harm a number of agricultural crops as well as natural ecosystems.  
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captures both the extent of the range of NIS establishment as well as expected 
damage within that range.   
The inspection agency inspects potentially contaminated imports at the port of 
entry.  The likelihood of detecting at least one actionable NIS is a function of the 
expected infection rate and inspection intensity I , where inspection intensity 
captures the effort devoted to inspections.  Effort may vary by the sampling rate per 
volume of imports as well as the sampling procedure employed.  For example, given 
equivalent sampling rates, an inspection procedure based on a randomized sample is 
more intensive than an inspection procedure that samples those units most readily 
available for inspection (sometimes referred to as “tailgate inspections”).  Inspection 
intensity also varies by the effort expended on physical examination (visual 
examination, dissection, etc.) once a sample has been selected.    
Inspections are imperfect and costly.  The detection rate, denoted ( , )h I q , lies 
between zero and one and is concave in both the expected infection rate and 









































.  The sign of the cross product depends on the functional form 
of the detection rate and, in general, is ambiguous 










.  The total cost 
of inspection is denoted by ( )wkIx p where 0k   represents the per-unit cost of 
inspection effort.   
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A specific tariff   is collected based on the volume of imports.  The tariff 
includes user fees imposed to recover inspection costs as well as any import duties 
collected at the border.   
If an actionable NIS is discovered in the process of inspection, the exporter 
has the option of treating, re-exporting, or destroying the contaminated imports.  In 
the US the majority of detected agricultural imports are treated and subsequently 
admitted for consumption.  Assuming the treatment technology perfectly destroys the 
target pest, the number of damaging NIS admitted into Home is proportional to the 
difference between total infected goods received at the border and infected goods 
discovered during the course of inspection,  ( ) ( , )wx p q h I q .   
Trade costs due to inspections may include direct expenditures on treatment of 
detected contaminated imports as well as indirect costs due to delay of perishable 
commodities at the border.  The direct cost due to treatment is denoted f and the per-
unit direct cost of treating contaminated imports is  ,fh I q .  Indirect trade costs due 
to inspections include deterioration in product quality due to delay at the border, 
damage during the course of inspection, as well as increased financing expenses and 
penalties for late delivery.  The per-unit indirect cost due to border inspections is 
























Weighted Social Welfare 









y p dp , tariff revenue, the cost of border inspections, 
and damage due to admitted NIS.  Since the actual infection rate is unobserved prior 
to inspection, inspections are conducted on the basis of the expected infection rate.  
The inspection agency maximizes the following weighted social welfare function.       
(2.1.1)    
0




W I D p dp y p dp m p kIx p x p q h I q   

        
where 1  denotes the exogenous weight the government places on domestic 
producer surplus relative to other components of social welfare.  Material balance and 
price arbitrage conditions close the model: 
(2.1.2) ( ) ( )wx p m p  
(2.1.3)   ( , )wp p b I fh I q    . 
The equilibrium price and material balance conditions hold simultaneously and 
determine the expected response of domestic and world prices to changes in both the 
























































 is the export supply elasticity and 0
m p
p m
   

 is the 
import demand elasticity.   
 The response of domestic and world prices to changes in the tariff rate are as 
expected.  An increase in the tariff increases the domestic price while the world price 
is decreasing in the tariff (the typical terms of trade result).  If Home is a small 
country the world price is unresponsive to changes in the tariff rate; in this case, the 
full marginal cost due to the tariff is passed through to domestic consumers, 1
dp
d
 .   
Assuming a positive infection rate, an increase in inspection intensity 
increases the domestic price.  With respect to the world price, consider the small and 
large country cases separately.  If Home is a small importing country the full 





  .  Alternatively, if Home is a sufficiently large importer (   ) then a 
portion of the trade cost is passed through to the world price, and the world price 
decreases as inspection intensity increases. 
 
2.3 Analysis 
2.3.1  Optimal Tariff and Inspection Intensity 
In this section I examine the characteristics of the optimal tariff rate and 
inspection intensity chosen to maximize the weighted social welfare function.  I begin 
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by deriving the optimal tariff rate as a function of inspection intensity, followed by 
derivation of the implicit expression for optimal inspection intensity.  I present the 
relationship between these two policy instruments as well as an analysis of the 
response of the optimal tariff and inspection intensity to the parameters of the model.  
This section concludes with a summary of the key results. 
 
Tariff Rate 
Incorporating the material balance condition into equation (2.1.1), the 
weighted social welfare function can be rewritten as follows:   
(2.2.1)    
,
0




W I D p dp y p dp m p kI q h I q

   

         . 
The optimal tariff is chosen to maximize the weighted social welfare function.  The 
first order necessary condition for choice of the tariff is given by 
(2.2.2) 






             
. 
Equation (2.2.2) can be solved for the optimal tariff rate as a function of inspection 
intensity: 
(2.2.3)      1 0
Wp p y




       . 
This tariff rate is the large country, political economy version of the optimal tariff 
derived in McAusland and Costello (2004).  The optimal tariff can be broken down 
into terms of trade, political economy, and NIS border inspection components.   
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First, there is the standard terms of trade (or market power) component equal 
to the ratio of world price over the export supply elasticity 
Wp

.  This term captures 
the import market power of the importing country and reflects the degree to which the 
importing country can pass the cost of the tariff through to the world price.  As the 
export supply elasticity increases a smaller portion of the tariff is passed through to 
the world price and the government prefers to impose a smaller tariff.     
The standard political economy component of the tariff is represented by 




 .  The tariff increases as the weight the government places on domestic 
producer surplus   increases.  This implies that the government will prefer to impose 
a larger import tariff on those commodities with more politically influential import-
competing domestic producers.  The tariff is also increasing in the inverse import 
penetration ratio, such that the government prefers to impose a higher tariff on sectors 
with a larger domestic production sector relative to imports.  Finally, as the import 
demand elasticity increases the domestic price is less responsive to a change in the 
tariff.  Since the tariff is less effective at transferring surplus from consumers to 
producers the government prefers to impose a smaller tariff.   
The NIS border inspection component of the optimal tariff is set to recover the 
cost of conducting inspections kI and to internalize marginal expected damage due to 
admitted NIS  q h  .  This is the McAusland and Costello (2004) component of 
the optimal tariff.  Note that the cost of conducting border inspections could also be 





Inspection intensity is chosen to maximize the weighted social welfare 
function presented in equation (2.2.1).  The first order necessary condition for choice 
of inspection intensity is given by 
(2.2.4)
       , 1 0I
dW I dp m
m k h m y kI q h
dI dI p

   
 
               
. 
Substituting equations (2.1.4), (2.1.6), and (2.2.2) into equation (2.2.4) and 
simplifying yields 
(2.2.5)      0I I I IdW dWb fh m b k h fdI d        . 
Assuming the tariff is set optimally the first order necessary condition for optimal 
choice of inspection intensity simplifies to: 
(2.2.6)    0I IdW m b k h fdI       . 
Optimal inspection intensity equates the marginal cost of an additional unit of 
inspection intensity Ib k , with the marginal net benefit of an additional unit of 
inspection intensity  Ih f  : 
(2.2.7)   
Marginalcost Marginalnet benefit
I Ib k h f   . 
Note that f   is a necessary condition for positive inspection intensity * 0I  .  
This implies that marginal expected damage must exceed marginal treatment cost for 
border inspection to be worthwhile. 
 First, I evaluate the conditions under which it is optimal to inspect imports.  
Under the assumptions of the McAusland and Costello (2004) model – detected 
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contaminated imports are destroyed, the detection rate is proportional the infection 
rate  h qr I , and  0Ir   – inspection intensity is positive if marginal NIS 
damage   exceeds foreign marginal cost of production (denoted c  in McAusland 
and Costello 2004).  This implies that optimal inspection intensity is positive for all 
infection rates below an upper bound on the infection rate defined by 1 cq   .  In 
this model detected imports are treated.  The following proposition demonstrates that 
there is a lower bound on the infection rate (as opposed to an upper bound) below 
which it is optimal to not inspect. 
 
PROPOSITION 1.   
When inspection intensity and the tariff are set optimally, optimal inspection intensity 
is positive whenever q q  such that      
0
0, 0 0I I
I
dW




     .   
 
Proof.  When  is set optimally,      
0
0, 0 0I I
I
dW




       by 












  whenever 
q q .  Since 0I  , *I is positive whenever q q  and is zero otherwise.   
 
PROPOSITION 1 presents a general condition defining the range of infection 
rates over which optimal inspection intensity is positive.  The following presents 
special cases corresponding to alternative functional forms of the detection rate 
 ,h I q .  First, as in McAusland and Costello (2004), the detection rate may be 
proportional to the infection rate such that  h qr I .  Second, as demonstrated in the 
statistical literature on sampling for rare individuals, the detection rate may be 
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approximated by an exponential distribution, 1 qIh e  (Venette, Moon, and 
Hutchinson 2002).     
 
COROLLARY 1.   
If  h qr I  and   0Ir  then 0q   and * 0I   over all positive infection rates. 
 









    for all positive 
infection rates.          
 
 
As shown in COROLLARY 1, if detections are proportional to the infection rate 
and.  0Ir  .(as in McAusland and Costello 2004), then optimal inspection 
intensity is positive over all infection rates provided marginal damage exceeds the 
marginal cost of treating detected contaminated imports.  Next, consider the lower 
bound on the infection rate assuming the detection rate is approximated by an 
exponential distribution. 
 
COROLLARY 2.   








 and * 0I   if q q . 
 









         for q q .     
 
As McAusland and Costello (2004) point out for the case where detections are 
proportional to the infection rate, if  0,Ih q  is finite then there is a lower bound on 
the infection rate below which it is optimal to not inspect.  This is confirmed in 








 if 1 qIh e  .  Note that q  increases 
 29 
 
as the marginal cost due to inspections Ib k  increases, increases as the cost of 
treating detected imports f  increases, and decreases as marginal damage   
decreases.     
The fact that there is no upper bound on the infection rate is due to the 
assumption that detected imports are treated, rather than destroyed.  This also 
assumes that 1q   – if the inspection agency is certain that imports are infected, there 
is no need to inspect.  Also, as pointed out by McAusland and Costello (2004), if the 
importer is permitted to treat all imports irrespective of the outcome of inspections 
and expected NIS damage exceeds the cost of treatment, then it is optimal to treat all 
imports and forego inspections entirely. 
 Next, I show that it is never optimal for the inspection agency to exhaust all 
detection opportunities.  McAusland and Costello (2004) obtain the same result – I 
show that their result holds up under the more general specification considered in this 
model. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.   
It is never optimal to exhaust all detection opportunities unless inspection is costless: 
 *,h I q q  with equality only if 0Ib k  . 
 
Proof. 
The marginal cost of inspection is non-negative by assumption 0Ib k  .  If all 





    is negative unless 0Ib k  .  Therefore it is never optimal to 
exhaust all detection opportunities unless inspection is costless. 
 
At a sufficiently high level of inspection intensity all detection opportunities 
are exhausted and the marginal benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity is 
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zero.  When an optimal tariff is imposed inspections are targeted to address the NIS 
externality, independent of terms of trade and political economy considerations.  If 
the marginal cost of an additional unit of inspection intensity is always positive, 
0Ib k  , then it is never optimal to inspect to the point where the marginal benefit 
of an additional unit of inspection intensity is zero, i.e. it is never optimal to exhaust 
all detection opportunities.   
 
Comparative Static Analysis 
Figure 1 illustrates the derivation of the optimal level of inspection intensity 
assuming q q .  Note that the marginal cost curve is increasing in inspection 
intensity if 0IIb  and the net marginal benefit curve is decreasing in inspection 
intensity if 0IIh  .  When the tariff is set optimally, inspection intensity is purely a 
function of the cost due to inspections Ib k  and the net marginal benefit due to 





Figure 1: Optimal inspection intensity 
 
 
The following presents comparative static results with respect to a number of 
the parameters of the model.  I assume that the objective function is locally concave 






  such that 




dp m y m m dpd p dp
m kI q h
d d d p p p p d
  
   
                           
.  
Assuming the objective function is locally concave in the tariff rate, combined with 
assumptions on the primitives of the model – 0and 0II IIb h   – and the fact that 
f   is a necessary condition for positive inspection intensity, ensures that the 












 , and 
Ik b  
 Ih f   
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.  Detailed expressions for the sufficient conditions and 
derivation of the comparative static results are presented in Appendix A.   
Although optimal inspection intensity is independent of the tariff rate, 
equation (2.2.3) shows that the optimal tariff is a function of inspection intensity.  
The relationship between the optimal tariff and optimal inspection intensity can be 
derived as follows: 




0I I I I
d W d W m dp dW d W
b fh b fh
dId d p d m d d    
 
       
. 
These two instruments are therefore substitutes, implying that an increase in 
inspection intensity reduces the optimal tariff rate.   
 
Weight on Domestic Producer Surplus 
I begin by examining the optimal policy response to political economy 
motives.  As illustrated in Figure 1 optimal inspection intensity is independent of the 
weight on domestic producer surplus when the tariff is set optimally.  The tariff is a 
function of the weight on domestic producer surplus and, as expected, the government 
prefers to impose a larger tariff on imports of commodities produced by politically 
influential domestic producers.  Margolis and Shogren (2007) obtain a similar result.  
Economic surplus is transferred from consumers to producers through an increase in 
domestic price.  Of the two policy instruments, the tariff is more efficient at achieving 
the desired transfer.  Border inspection increases domestic price but it does so by 
imposing costs that are not recovered,    ,b I fh I q .  An import tariff, on the other 
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hand, increases domestic price in a manner that generates revenue.  Therefore, 
assuming it can set both instruments optimally, the government prefers imposing a 
tariff to transfer surplus from consumers to producers.  PROPOSITION 3 summarizes 
these results.   
 
PROPOSITION 3.   
When the tariff is set optimally 
1. An increase in the weight on domestic producer surplus will have no effect on 
optimal inspection intensity; 
2. An increase in the weight on domestic producer surplus will increase the 
optimal tariff. 
 
Proof.   















   .    
 
Expected NIS Damage 
Next, consider the optimal policy responses to expected marginal NIS 
damage.  We can see from Figure 1 that an increase in expected marginal damage   
shifts the net marginal benefit curve up and does not influence the marginal cost 
curve.  This implies that an increase in expected NIS damage increases optimal 
inspection intensity.  The response of the tariff rate is not so straightforward.  Since 
inspection intensity and the tariff rate are substitutes when the tariff is set optimally, it 
may be optimal to impose a higher or a lower tariff on more damaging imports.  






PROPOSITION 4.  
When the tariff is set optimally 
1. An increase in expected marginal NIS damage will increase optimal 
inspection intensity; 
2. An increase in expected marginal NIS damage will increase (decrease) the 















    . 
 
Proof.  





d b h f 
 
 
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.   
 
As in McAusland and Costello (2004), the relationship between the tariff and 
marginal damage is a function of two opposing forces.  First, the Pigouvian 
component of the tariff is set in order to internalize expected damage due to admitted 
NIS.  The direct response to an increase in expected damage is therefore to increase 













  .  Second, as shown in part 1 of PROPOSITION 4, 
when expected damage increases it is optimal to increase inspection intensity.  Since 
the tariff rate and inspection intensity are substitutes an increase in border inspection 




   .  The overall response of the 
tariff rate to a change in expected NIS damage depends on the relative magnitude of 
the Pigouvian versus the substitution effect.  If the Pigouvian effect is larger than the 
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substitution effect, then the tariff increases as expected damage increases.  If the 
substitution effect is larger than the Pigouvian effect, then the tariff will decrease as 
expected damage increases. 
 
Treatment Cost 
The optimal policy response to a change in the cost of treating detected 
imports is evaluated in PROPOSITION 5.  As shown in Figure 1, an increase in marginal 
treatment cost shifts the net marginal benefit curve down and to the left and leaves the 
marginal cost curve unchanged.  This implies that an increase in treatment cost will 
reduce optimal inspection intensity.  The optimal response of the tariff rate is 
ambiguous. 
 
PROPOSITION 5.  
When the tariff is set optimally 
1. An increase in marginal treatment cost will decrease optimal inspection 
intensity; 
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     


.   
 
The response of the optimal tariff rate to marginal treatment cost is comprised 
of two effects.  First, there is the direct effect of an increase in the treatment cost on 
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the tariff.  This effect – explored in greater detail in COROLLARY 3 below – trades-off 
terms of trade and political economy motives for the tariff and is ambiguous.  Second, 
treatment cost has an indirect impact on the tariff via inspection intensity.  As 
treatment cost increases optimal inspection intensity falls.  Since the tariff is a 
substitute for inspection intensity, the optimal tariff increases as inspection intensity 
falls.   
As demonstrated in the following corollary, when the importer is a small 
country, an increase in treatment cost will unambiguously increase the optimal tariff.   
 
COROLLARY 3. 
If the importer is a small country then an increase in the cost of treatment will 
increase the optimal tariff.  
Proof.  When the importer is a small country 1
dp
d














d W m dp y m
kI q h




           
.  This implies that 




















                


.   
 
When the importer is a small country an increases in treatment cost increases 
the optimal tariff rate.  This implies that terms of trade effects are responsible for the 
potentially ambiguous result presented in PROPOSITION 5..  The indirect effect of 
treatment cost on the tariff rate works as follows.  First, when treatment cost increases 
the domestic price increases.  An increase in domestic price reduces imports and 
increases domestic supply – as a consequence, the ratio of domestic production to 
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import volume increases.  This increases the marginal value of the tariff in terms of 
shifting surplus from consumers to producers.  When the importer is a large country, 
however, then this price effect is partially absorbed by the world price (reducing the 
marginal value of an increase in the tariff).   
When the importer is a small country, there is no protectionism 1  , and the 





   .  In this case, 
response of the tariff to an increase in treatment cost is strictly positive and is entirely 
comprised of the direct substitution of the tariff for inspection intensity.   
 
Infection Rate 
The optimal response of inspection intensity to a change in the infection rate 
is less straightforward than the comparative static results presented above.  
McAusland and Costello (2004) demonstrate – in the case where detection is 
proportional to the infection rate and detected imports are destroyed – that the 
response of inspection intensity to the infection rate is ambiguous: at low infection 
rates inspection intensity is increasing in the infection rate, whereas at high infection 
rates inspection intensity is decreasing in the infection rate.  This non-montonicity is 
due to two opposing factors.  First, as the infection rate increases, the marginal 
productivity of an additional unit of inspection intensity increases ( 0Iqh   using the 
notation in this model).  Second, as more contaminated imports are detected, and as a 
consequence rejected, domestic price increases and this increases the marginal value 
of the last unit rejected.   
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Under the assumptions of this model the impact of a change in the infection 
rate on inspection intensity is once again ambiguous.  However, in this model the 
non-monotonicity is due to the ambiguity of the marginal productivity of an 
additional unit of inspection intensity given an increase in the infection rate ( 0Iqh

 ).   
 
PROPOSITION 6.  
When the tariff is set optimally  
1. An increase in the expected infection rate will increase (decrease) optimal 
inspection intensity if  0Iqh   . 
2. An increase in the expected infection rate will have an ambiguous impact on 
the optimal tariff rate. 
 
Proof.   
1. Differentiating equation (2.2.6) yields 
 











 0Iqh   .  
2.  Differentiating equation (2.2.2) yields 
 
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b fh








   
         

 
.   
 
PROPOSITION 6 demonstrates that optimal inspection intensity may be 
increasing or decreasing in the rate of infection of imported goods.  Under the 
assumptions used by McAusland and Costello (2004), if a backstop treatment 
technology is available and the detection rate is proportional to the infection rate, then 
inspection intensity is non-decreasing in the infection rate.  PROPOSITION 6 confirms 
this.  If  h qr I , then   0Iq Ih r I  and the inspection agency prefers to inspect 
imports with higher infection rates more intensively.   
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The McAusland-Costello result does not hold for more general specifications 
of detection.  For example, if the detection rate is approximated by an exponential 
distribution then   1 1 0Iqh qI h     and inspection intensity may increase or 
decrease in response to an increase in the expected infection rate.  At low 
combinations of the infection rate and inspection intensity – specifically, when 1qI   
– optimal inspection intensity will increase as the infection rate increases.  When the 
combination of the infection rate and inspection intensity is sufficiently high the 
marginal detection rate (with respect to the infection rate) decreases with an increase 
in the infection rate, and optimal inspection intensity will decrease with an increase in 
the infection rate.   
The response of the tariff rate to the expected infection rate is also ambiguous.  
Three effects determine the relationship between the optimal tariff and the infection 
rate.  First, there is the direct effect of the infection rate corresponding to the 



















.  The impact of the 
first effect is ambiguous.  An increase in the infection rate increases expected damage 
as well as expected detections (this reduces expected damage).  The overall impact of 
the Pigouvian component therefore depends on the relative magnitude of the increase 
in marginal expected damage versus the increase in the marginal detection rate (with 
respect to the infection rate).   
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The second effect is related to the terms of trade and political economy 

















   .  As shown in COROLLARY 3, if the 
importer is a small country, this second effect will have a positive impact on the 
optimal tariff as the infection rate increases.  Also, if the importer is a small country, 
there is no protectionism  1  , and the tariff is set optimally, then the second effect 
goes to zero.   
The third effect captures the response of the optimal tariff to a change in 





  .  This corresponds to the substitution effect 
described in preceding comparative static results.  Since the tariff is a substitute for 
inspection intensity, this effect adjusts the tariff to offset the change in inspection 
intensity.  In this case, the response of inspection intensity to the infection rate is 
ambiguous, and the impact of the substitution effect is therefore also ambiguous.   
 
Summary 
 To summarize, when the tariff and inspection intensity are set optimally, 
inspection intensity tends to behave as anticipated.  Inspection intensity is 
unresponsive to the weight on domestic producer surplus, consistent with the notion 
that policy is targeted in order to achieve government objectives in the least distorting 
manner.  It is optimal to increase inspection intensity when the marginal net benefit of 
inspections (avoided damage minus the cost of treatment) increases.  Following 
similar reasoning, it is optimal to decrease inspection intensity when the cost due to 
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inspections, including direct price effects and the actual cost of conducting 
inspections, increases.   
The impact of the infection rate on optimal inspection intensity is dependent 
on the functional form of detections.  If detections are proportional to the infection 
rate then, all else equal, the inspection agency always prefers to inspect imports with 
a higher expected infection rate more intensively.  Alternatively, if detections are best 
approximated by an exponential distribution, then inspection intensity may be 
decreasing in the infection rate at a sufficiently high combination of inspection 
intensity and the infection rate.   
As expected, I show that the optimal tariff is increasing in the weight the 
government places on domestic producer welfare.  Although inspection intensity is 
set independent of the tariff, the optimal tariff is used to substitute for changes in 
inspection intensity.  There are also more direct relationships between the tariff and 
the parameters of the model and these effects tend to counteract the role of the tariff 
as a substitute for inspections.  As a consequence, a number of the optimal tariff 
comparative static results are ambiguous.   
  
2.3.2 Predetermined Tariff 
 In this section I examine the characteristics of optimal border inspection 
intensity assuming the tariff rate is predetermined.  A predetermined tariff may be the 
outcome of a trade agreement as well as restrictions on the ability of governments to 
impose import taxes to address NIS threats.  Fruit and vegetable imports are a major 
pathway for NIS introductions into the US and the empirical component of this 
 42 
 
dissertation examines border inspection of US fresh vegetable imports primarily 
sourced from Mexico.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) phased 
out the use of import tariffs on US fruit and vegetable imports from Mexico and 
Canada.  Therefore, the tariff applied to US fresh vegetable imports from North 
American trading partners is likely too low from a political economy, terms of trade, 
and NIS perspective.   
When the tariff is predetermined the inspection agency chooses inspection 
intensity to maximize the following weighted social welfare function: 
(2.3.1)    
0




W I D p dp y p dp m p kI q h I q  

         . 
As in the previous section, the first order necessary condition for inspection intensity 
is written as: 
(2.3.2) 
      0I I I I I
dW I dW




       . 
When the tariff is set optimally 0
dW
d
 and optimal inspection intensity is defined 
implicitly by the expression   0I I Im b fh k h    .  If the tariff is not set 
optimally, it may be too stringent, in which case 0
dW
d




 .  I examine both cases in the following analysis.   
In the previous section, the first order necessary condition for inspection 
intensity was written such that the marginal cost due to border inspection equaled the 
marginal net benefit due to border inspection.  The first order condition for optimal 
inspection intensity presented in equation (2.3.2) can be rewritten in a similar manner:   
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(2.3.3)    




b k b h f f
d m d m

 
        
. 
I assume that expected marginal damage exceeds the cost of treating detected imports 
f  .  Otherwise the inspection agency would allow detected contaminated imports 
to enter without treatment.  Consider the two cases.  If 0
dW
d
 , then the adjusted 
marginal cost is strictly positive and f   is a necessary condition for positive 
adjusted marginal net benefit.  Alternatively, if 0
dW
d
 , then adjusted marginal net 
benefit is strictly positive and positive adjusted marginal cost requires that 




   .  
As in the previous section, I assume the second order sufficient condition is 






  (see Appendix A for the full expression).  Also, note 
that adjusted marginal net benefits are decreasing in inspection intensity if the 




h fdW d W dW m dp
h f f
d m m d dI d p dI m

  
            
. 





bdW d W dW m dp
b m
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The conditions presented in equations (2.3.4) and (2.3.5), which do not follow from 
the primitives of the model but are assumed to hold, are sufficient to ensure that the 
optimal level of inspection intensity is unique.   
First, consider the optimal level of inspection intensity when the 
predetermined tariff is higher than optimal 0
dW
d
 .  When the tariff is higher than 













.  As shown in Figure 2, when the tariff is higher than optimal, the marginal 
net benefit curve shifts down and to the left, the marginal cost curve shifts up and to 
the left, and the optimal level of inspection intensity is lower than the first best 





Figure 2: Optimal inspection intensity when tariff higher than optimal 
 
Next, when the predetermined tariff is lower than optimal, 0
dW
d
 , the 













.  Figure 3 shows that the marginal net benefit curve shifts up 
and to the right while the marginal cost curve shifts down and to the right.  This 
implies that the optimal level of inspection intensity is greater than the first best 




 Ih f 
*I















Figure 3: Optimal inspection intensity when tariff lower than optimal 
 
When the tariff is set optimally, the relationships between optimal inspection 
intensity and the parameters of the model are relatively straightforward.  These 
relationships are more complicated when the tariff is predetermined.  Substituting the 
full expression for 
dW
d
 into equation (2.3.3), the adjusted-marginal-cost-adjusted-
marginal-net-benefit equality can be rewritten as: 
(2.3.6)
     
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Ib k  
 Ih f   
*I  















When the tariff is set optimally, optimal border inspection intensity is set independent 
of the weight on domestic producer surplus, the domestic price, and the level of 
imports.  As shown in equation (2.3.6) this independence no longer holds when the 
tariff is not set optimally.  This implies that optimal inspection intensity will depend 
on the welfare weight the government places on domestic producers.  Further, the 
relationships between optimal inspection intensity and the parameters that influence 
domestic price (and import volume) – including marginal treatment cost f  and the 
expected infection rate q  – are more complicated when the tariff is not set optimally.   
The following set of propositions are derived from the implicit expression for 
optimal inspection intensity presented in equation (2.3.2).  As in the previous section, 
I begin with an evaluation of the conditions under which it is optimal to inspect 
imports.  PROPOSITION 1 presented a general condition for positive optimal inspection 
intensity when the tariff is set optimally.  The following proposition presents a 
general condition for positive optimal inspection intensity when the tariff is 
predetermined.   
 
PROPOSITION 7.   
When the tariff is predetermined, optimal inspection intensity is positive 
whenever q q such that 
        
0 0 0
0, 0 0 0I I I
I I I
dW dW dW
h q m f f m b k b
dI d d

   
 
       
 
.   
 
Proof.  When  is predetermined, 
        
0 0 0
0, 0 0 0I I I
I I I
dW dW dW
h q m f f m b k b
dI d d

   
 
       
 
by 












  whenever 




 PROPOSITION 7 presents a general condition for positive inspection intensity.  
As in the previous section, it is useful to consider special cases corresponding to the 
functional form of the detection rate.  The special case where the detection rate is 
proportional to the infection rate is presented first.       
 
COROLLARY 4. 
If  h qr I ,  0Ir  , and the tariff is predetermined then 0q  and * 0I  over all 
positive infection rates. 
 









      
 for 
all positive infection rates. 
 
As in the case where both the tariff rate and inspection intensity are set 
optimally, COROLLARY 4 shows that inspection intensity is positive over all infection 
rates when the detection rate is proportional to the infection rate – consistent with the 
functional form imposed in McAusland and Costello (2004).  This also implies that 
the range of infection rates over which it is optimal to inspect is independent of the 
level of the predetermined tariff relative to the optimal tariff rate.  Next, consider 
optimal inspection intensity when the detection rate is approximated by an 
exponential distribution.   
 
COROLLARY 5. 
If 1 qIh e  and the tariff is predetermined then 























Proof.  Note that  0,Ih q q .  This implies that 
      
0 0 0
0 0 0I I
I I I
dW dW dW
mq f fq m b k b
dI d d

   
        for q q .   
 
As shown in COROLLARY 5, if the detection rate is approximated by an 
exponential distribution, then there is a lower bound infection rate below which it is 
optimal to not inspect.  Once again, this result is consistent with the result obtained 
when the tariff is set optimally.  Inspection of the expression for q  presented in 
COROLLARY 5 reveals that the range of infection rates over which inspection intensity 
is positive varies according to the predermined tariff rate.  If the tariff is less than 
optimal then q is lower than it would be if the tariff was set optimally, and the 
inspection agency prefers to inspect over a wider range of infection rates.  
Alternatively, if the initial tariff is higher than optimal then the inspection agency 
prefers to inspect over a smaller range of infection rates. 
When the tariff and inspection intensity are set optimally and the detection 
rate is approximated by the exponential distribution, the lower bound on the infection 
rate decreases in marginal damage, increases in marginal treatment cost, and is 
independent of the weight on domestic producer surplus.  When the tariff is 
predetermined, the lower bound on the infection rate is decreasing in marginal 
damage and the weight on domestic producer surplus.  Further, the lower bound on 
the infection rate may be increasing or decreasing in marginal treatment cost.  These 







COROLLARY 6.   
If 1 qIh e   and the tariff is predetermined 
1. An increase in expected marginal NIS damage will decrease the lower bound 
infection rate; 
2. An increase in the weight on domestic producer surplus will decrease the 
lower bound infection rate; 
3. An increase in marginal treatment cost will increase (decrease) the lower 





   . 
 
Proof.  Differentiating the lower bound infection rate





















































































When the tariff is set optimally, an increase in marginal treatment cost reduces 
the marginal net benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity and the 
inspection agency prefers to inspect over a smaller range of infection rates.  When the 
tariff is predetermined, an increase in marginal treatment cost has an additional effect 
corresponding to the level of the predetermined tariff relative to the optimal tariff.  If 
the tariff is higher than optimal, then the lower bound on the infection rate is 
increasing in marginal treatment cost.  Alternatively, if the predetermined tariff is 
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lower than optimal, then the lower bound on the infection rate may be increasing or 
decreasing in marginal treatment cost.  The relationship is more likely to be positive 
if the government prefers to increase the domestic price of imports – due to, for 
example, an unfulfilled preference (due to a constraint on the use of tariffs) to transfer 
surplus from domestic consumers to producers.   
Finally, consider whether or not the inspection agency finds it optimal to 
exhaust detection opportunities.  Recall that when the tariff is set optimally, it is never 
optimal to exhaust all detection opportunities unless the marginal cost due to 
inspection is zero 0Ib k  .  In other words, as long as the marginal cost of an 
additional unit of inspection intensity is costly, the inspection agency will never find 
it optimal to inspect to the point where the marginal detection rate is zero 0Ih  .    
 
PROPOSITION 8. 
When the tariff rate is predetermined and   
1. Lower than optimal, then it may be optimal to exhaust all detection 
opportunities; 
2. Higher than optimal, then it is never optimal to exhaust all detection 
opportunities. 
 





    
 
.  If  *, 0Ih I q   and 0
dW
dI
  it is not optimal to exhaust 
all inspection opportunities.  If  *, 0Ih I q   and 0
dW
dI





 , then substituting    1
h q
dW dp m











    
 
 yields 
   1 0I
dW dp m







        
 and it may be optimal to 










     
 
 and it is optimal to decrease 
inspection intensity. 
 
In contrast to the case where the tariff rate is set optimally, PROPOSITION 8 
demonstrates that it may be optimal to exhaust all detection opportunities if the 
predetermined tariff is lower than optimal.  When the tariff is set optimally, the 
government has no incentive to use border inspections to transfer surplus to domestic 
producers, whereas if the tariff is too lax the ‘cost’ of an additional unit of inspection 
intensity is lower due to political economy motivations.  If incentives to transfer 
surplus to domestic producers are sufficiently high, then the inspection agency will 
find it optimal to exhaust all detection opportunities.   
 
Comparative Static Analysis 
Tariff rate 
 I begin the comparative static analysis of optimal inspection intensity with the 
tariff rate.  Recall from the previous section that inspection intensity is set 
independent of the tariff rate and the tariff is a substitute for inspection intensity when 
both instruments are set optimally.  As shown in equation (2.3.6), when the tariff is 
predetermined the optimal level of inspection intensity is dependent on the tariff.  The 
following proposition examines the response of inspection intensity to a change in the 






PROPOSITION 9.   
Assuming the objective function is locally concave in the tariff rate, when the tariff 
rate is predetermined 
1. And the initial tariff is higher than optimal, an increase in the tariff rate will 
decrease optimal border inspection intensity; 
2. And the initial tariff rate is lower than optimal, an increase in the initial tariff 
rate will increase (decrease) optimal inspection intensity if the elasticity of 





Proof.   Differentiating equation (2.3.2) yields 
 
   
 














d W m dp dW
b fh
d p d m d
b fhdI dW





























  is the elasticity of 
dW
d









the elasticity of m  with respect to  .   
1. If the initial tariff rate is higher than optimal 0
dW
d
  and 0
dI
d
 .   
2. If the initial tariff rate is lower than optimal 0
dW
d
  and  0dI
d







   .   
 
PROPOSITION 9 demonstrates that inspection intensity is used as a substitute 
for the tariff rate when the initial tariff is higher than optimal.  This is consistent with 
the common notion in the trade policy literature that reductions in tariff rates are 
offset by increases in the stringency of non-tariff barriers (Josling, Roberts, and 
Orden 2004).  When the initial tariff is lower than optimal, this relationship may 
reverse such that a decrease in the tariff rate will decrease optimal inspection 
intensity.   
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 with respect to   determines the response of inspection intensity to 
the predetermined tariff and can be described as follows.  A reduction in the 
predetermined tariff increases m , which reduces the marginal increase in welfare due 




, which increases the marginal increase in welfare due to an 
additional unit of inspection intensity.  The overall impact of a reduction in the 
predetermined tariff on optimal inspection intensity therefore depends on the relative 




 with respect to  , then the inspection agency prefers to decrease 
inspection intensity in response to a decrease in the predetermined tariff.   
 
Weight on Domestic Producer Surplus 
 When the tariff rate and inspection intensity are set jointly, inspection 
intensity is unresponsive to changes in the weight on domestic producer surplus – the 
tariff dominates inspection intensity as the most efficient policy instrument for 
shifting rents to the domestic production sector.  If the tariff rate is predetermined, 
border inspection is the only instrument available, and inspection intensity is 






PROPOSITION 10.  
When the tariff is predetermined, an increase in the weight on domestic producer 
surplus will increase optimal inspection intensity. 
 









   .   
 
As shown in the previous section, the optimal tariff is strictly increasing in the 
weight on domestic producer surplus.  This implies that 
dW
d
 increases as the weight 
on domestic producer surplus increases.  As shown in Figure 2 and 3, an increase in 
dW
d
 shifts the marginal cost of an additional unit of inspection intensity down and to 
the left and shifts the marginal net benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity 
up and to the right.  Therefore, when the weight on domestic producer surplus 
increases the inspection agency prefers to inspect imports more intensively.   
The rate of response of inspection intensity to a change in the weight on 




, as well as the size of the domestic production sector y .  
Note that the responsiveness of domestic price depends on the size of the importing 
country.  If the importer is small, then the full marginal price effect of border 
inspection I Ib fh  is passed through to the domestic price.  This implies that border 
inspection is a less effective means of transferring surplus from consumers to 




Expected Marginal NIS Damage 
 When the tariff is set optimally inspection intensity is increasing in expected 
marginal damage.  This result carries over when the tariff is predetermined. 
 
PROPOSITION 11.  
When the tariff is predetermined, an increase in expected marginal NIS damage will 
increase optimal inspection intensity. 
 













   .   
 
PROPOSITION 11 shows that the inspection agency prefers to inspect more 
damaging imports more intensively.  This relationship can also be derived from the 
adjusted-marginal-cost-adjusted-marginal-net-benefit equality presented graphically 
in Figure 2 and 3.  The marginal cost of inspection intensity is decreasing in expected 
damage and the marginal net benefit is increasing in expected damage.  An increase 
in expected damage therefore shifts the marginal cost curve down and to the right and 
shifts the marginal net benefit curve up and to the right, implying that an increase in 
expected damage unambiguously increases optimal inspection intensity.  Note that 
the previous two propositions demonstrate that inspection intensity can increase due 




In the previous section I show that optimal inspection intensity is decreasing 
in marginal treatment cost, whereas the optimal tariff may be increasing or decreasing 
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in treatment cost.  When the tariff is predetermined, an increase in marginal treatment 
cost has an ambiguous impact on optimal inspection intensity.   
 
PROPOSITION 12.  
When the tariff is predetermined an increase in marginal treatment cost will have an 
ambiguous effect on optimal inspection intensity 
 












I I I I
b fhd W m dp m dp dW
mh b fh h h








   
            

.   
 
When the tariff is set optimally, inspection intensity adjusts to a change in 
treatment cost according to the first term, 0Imh  .  This term reflects the reduction 
in the marginal net benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity.  In Figure 2 
and 3 this implies the marginal net benefit curve shifts down and to the left in 
response to an increase in marginal treatment cost.     
The second term  
2
2I I
d W m dp
b fh h
d p d 
 
   
 captures the trade-off between 
terms of trade and political economy motives for the optimal tariff as described in 
PROPOSITION 5.  Since use of the tariff is constrained, this term influences optimal 
inspection intensity.  Recall that when the importer is small, there is no protectionism 
 1  , and the tariff is set optimally, this term goes to zero.   
The final term 
 I I
I
b fhm dp dW
h
p df m d
 
  
 captures the shifts in marginal 
cost and marginal net benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity; the 
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direction of these shifts depends on the level of the predetermined tariff rate relative 
to the optimal tariff rate.  Referring to Figure 2, if the tariff is higher than optimal an 
increase in marginal treatment cost shifts the marginal net benefit curve down and to 
the left by 1I
m dp f dW
h
p df m d
 
  










.  Therefore, if the tariff is higher than optimal then inspection 
intensity is more likely to decrease due to an increase in treatment cost.  
Alternatively, referring to Figure 3, if the predetermined tariff is lower than optimal 
an increase in marginal treatment cost shifts the marginal benefit curve up and to the 
right by 1I
m dp f dW
h
p df m d
 
  










.  In this case, inspection intensity is more likely to 
increase due to an increase in marginal treatment cost.  When the tariff is lower than 
optimal the inspection agency has greater incentive to increase domestic price 
compared to the case if the tariff is set optimally or higher than optimal.   
 
Expected Infection Rate 
 As is the case when the tariff is set optimally, when the tariff is predetermined 






PROPOSITION 13.  
When the tariff is predetermined an increase in the expected infection rate will have 
an ambiguous effect on optimal inspection intensity. 
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 As shown in PROPOSITION 13 the relationship between inspection intensity and 
the infection rate is ambiguous.  The first term  Iqmh f   , which depends on the 
marginal productivity of an additional unit of inspection intensity given a change in 
the infection rate Iqh , is ambiguous and corresponds to the case when the tariff is set 




 incorporates the Pigouvian component 
of the optimal tariff and has an ambiguous impact on optimal inspection intensity; an 
increase in the infection rate increases expected damage as well as expected 
detections.  Once again, the third term  
2
2I I q
d W m dp
b fh fh
d p d 
 
   
 captures the 
trade-off between terms of trade and political economy motives for the optimal tariff 
as described in PROPOSITION 6.   
The last term depends on whether or not the tariff is set lower or higher than 
optimal, according to the term 
 I I
Iq
b fh m dp dW
h
m p dq d
  
  
.  Note that if 0Iqh   and 
the tariff is lower than optimal, this term is positive and inspection intensity is more 
likely to be increasing in the infection rate.  Alternatively, if 0Iqh   and the tariff is 
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higher than optimal, then this term is negative and inspection intensity is more likely 
to be decreasing in the infection rate.   
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter generalizes the theory of optimal border inspections presented in 
earlier work along a number of dimensions in a manner consistent with US 
agricultural border inspections for NIS.  First, a political economy weight on 
domestic producer surplus is incorporated into the model.  Second, I relax the small 
country assumption and allow world price to adjust to variation in the policy 
instruments.  Third, I assume that detected imports are treated rather than destroyed.  
Fourth, I allow the detection rate to be nonlinear in the infection rate.  Finally, in 
addition to an analysis of joint determination of tariffs and inspection intensity, I 
examine the characteristics of optimal border inspection intensity when the import 
tariff is constrained.   
 When tariffs and inspections are both set optimally I find that inspection 
intensity is set independent of political economy considerations, consistent with the 
notion that an import tariff is a more efficient policy instrument for transferring rents 
from consumers to producers.  If the tariff is predetermined, optimal inspection 
intensity is a function of political economy considerations; I show that an increase in 
the welfare weight the government places on domestic producers will increase the 
politically optimal level of inspection intensity.  Optimal inspection intensity is 
increasing in expected marginal NIS damage irrespective of the level of the tariff rate.  
When the tariff is predetermined, I find that the relationships between inspection 
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intensity and the tariff, the infection rate, and marginal treatment cost are ambiguous.  
All three of these variables influence domestic price, and as a consequence the 
optimal tariff policy takes these price effects into account.  When use of the tariff is 
restricted, the inspection agency compensates by adjusting border inspection policy to 
offset these price effects.    
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3. Empirical Framework 
 
In this chapter, I introduce an empirical framework for analysis of the extent 
to which US border inspections for NIS are implemented in a trade distorting manner, 
versus implemented to address NIS risk.  In the first section I review the prior 
empirical trade literature evaluating the use of trade policy to protect domestic 
producers from import competition.  In the second section I outline the framework for 
the empirical analysis, guided by the theoretical model presented in the previous 
chapter.  I propose an econometric specification of the implicit expression for the 
politically optimal border inspection intensity.  Reduced form and structural 
specifications of the econometric model are presented.  I derived predictions for the 
reduced form model directly from the theory.  Similarly, the structural model is 
derived directly from the theory allowing me to identify two parameters of interest: 
the weight on domestic producer surplus and expected NIS damages implied by the 
actions of the inspection agency.   
 
3.1 Prior Literature 
The empirical trade literature examining the formation of NTBs has focused 
on industry-level determinants of NTBs in the US manufacturing sector.  The 
literature has addressed the simultaneity of imports and NTBs, and has tended to 
focus on political factors relevant to NTB protection.  Coverage ratios based on the 
portion of goods within an industry that are subject to NTBs have been used as a 
measure of the stringency of NTBs faced by individual industries.  Until recently, the 
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literature has assumed that the export supply of foreign goods is perfectly elastic; this 
assumption is relaxed by Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008). 
Ray (1981) examines the sequential formation of tariffs and NTBs in the US 
manufacturing industry in 1970.  An index of NTBs is constructed based on fifteen 
types of trade restrictions weighted by their relative effectiveness in restricting 
imports.  Ray finds that the level of tariff protection has a positive impact on the 
stringency of NTBs and concludes that industries that are able to secure higher tariff 
protection are also able to secure higher non-tariff protection.   
 Trefler (1993) examines the relationship between NTBs and US 
manufacturing imports (measured as an import penetration ratio) in 1983.12  
Econometric results indicate that the impact of import penetration on NTBs is 
statistically insignificant but the change in import penetration over a three year period 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on NTBs.  In the import penetration 
equation, NTBs are found to have a negative and statistically significant effect on 
import levels, a result that is robust to both the simultaneous equations approach and 
the single equation approach.   
Lee and Swagel (1997) follow the approach of Trefler (1993) but use a sample 
consisting of multiple countries (both developed and developing) and a cross-section 
of manufacturing industries.  Using a panel dataset allows the authors to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity by including industry and country fixed effects.  As in Ray 
(1981), Lee and Swagel (1997) find that both the tariff rate and the import penetration 
ratio have a positive impact on NTBs.  Lee and Swagel (1997) conclude that 
                                                 
12 The import penetration ratio is measured as imports divided by domestic consumption (domestic 
consumption is imports plus domestic production) 
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industries facing relatively more import competition are more likely to receive NTB 
protection.     
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) test the 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) political economy model of trade protection.  The 
variables of interest in these models are the import demand elasticity, the import 
penetration ratio, and a dummy indicating whether or not the industry is organized 
politically and can effectively lobby the government for trade protection.13  The 
Grossman-Helpman model predicts that the impact of import penetration on tariffs 
will depend on whether or not the industry lobbies the government for trade 
protection: if the industry is organized, import penetration will have a negative impact 
on protection whereas if the industry is not organized, then import penetration should 
have a positive impact on protection.  The Grossman-Helpman model therefore leads 
to a specification where the import penetration and the ‘lobbying’ variables are 
interacted.  A contribution of the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and the Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) papers is that they control for this interaction and find strong 
support for the Grossman-Helpman predictions.14   
Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) are the first to test the optimal tariff 
theory using export supply elasticity estimates.  They examine tariff formation in 
countries that are not members of the WTO, as well as the formation of most favored 
nation (MFN) tariffs, statutory tariffs, and NTBs in the US.  As opposed to the trade 
policy studies cited above, Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) use the entire cross-
                                                 
13 The import penetration ratio now refers to the ratio of imports to domestic production, rather than 
the ratio of imports to domestic consumption as in the previous studies. 
14 Both papers define industry organization on the basis of whether or not campaign contributions for 
that industry exceed a certain threshold.  Their measure of lobbying therefore captures the bribery 
aspect of political influence but does not account for other mechanisms of political lobbying.   
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section of imported goods in each country.  They find that tariffs in non-WTO 
countries are positively correlated with inverse export supply elasticities – strong 
evidence in support of the optimal tariff theory.  In the US, they find that MFN tariff 
rates (which are constrained by trade agreements) are not affected by importer market 
power whereas market power has a positive impact on statutory tariffs and NTBs.  All 
results are robust to the inclusion of import demand elasticity and import penetration 
ratios.     
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
The theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 presents an implicit expression 
for optimal inspection intensity: 
(3.1.1)        , 1 1 , 0IdW dp yk h I q kI q h I qdI dI m p
   
                
 
where 
    ,
0I I
W







.  Note that inspection intensity I enters 
equation (3.1.1) directly and indirectly through the detection rate,  ,h I q , the 
marginal detection rate,  ,Ih I q , and the marginal indirect trade cost due to 
inspections,  Ib I .  Inspection intensity is an index of inspection effort, which may 
vary by the fraction of goods selected for a physical inspection, the sampling rate 
within the subset of goods selected for a physical inspection, the method of selecting 
the sample, as well as the effort expended to detect NIS once a sample has been 
selected.  Therefore, as it is defined in this model, inspection intensity is not directly 
observable.   
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While inspection intensity is not observed directly, the average detection rate 
– based on the volume of inspected imports – is observed.  The average detection rate 
is a function of inspection intensity and the average infection rate per kilogram of 
imports.  The marginal detection rate is also unobserved.  However, the following 
assumption about the likelihood of detecting NIS generates an expression for the 
marginal detection rate that is a function of the expected infection rate as well as the 
expected detection rate.  Adopting an explicit functional form for the detection rate 
permits specification of a structural econometric model.       
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the statistical literature on sampling for rare 
individuals demonstrates that the probability of detecting at least one actionable pest 
at a sampling rate of less than 5 percent can be approximated by an exponential 
distribution (Venette, Moon, and Hutchinson 2002 refer to it as a Poisson 
distribution).  Since US agricultural inspectors sample at a rate of less than 5 percent 
from the total import volume selected for a physical inspection, the exponential 
distribution is appropriate in this empirical application.  Assuming an exponential 
distribution, the likelihood of detecting at least one actionable NIS can be written as a 
function of inspection intensity and the expected infection rate as follows:15  
(3.1.2)  , 1 qIh I q e  . 
The associated partial derivative with respect to inspection intensity,  1Ih q h  , is 
used to approximate the marginal detection rate in the structural model that follows. 
                                                 
15 As mentioned previously, inspection intensity is a function of the sampling rate as well as the 
efficacy of the inspection procedure.  Efficacy may include factors such as the choice of sample 
(random versus tailgate) as well as the effort expended to detect NIS within a given sample. 
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As presented in the theoretical model, total trade cost due to inspections is the 
sum of border costs as well as the cost of treating detected imports    ,b I fh I q .  
Border costs due to inspections  b I are unobserved.  For the purposes of the 
structural model I assume that border costs due to inspections are proportional to 
detections such that    ,b I bh I q .  Imports that are inspected have a positive 
expected infection rate by assumption; this implies 0Ih  and an increase in 
inspection intensity increases total trade costs associated with border inspections.  
Given these assumptions total expected trade cost due to inspections is written 
as      , ,b f h I q ah I q  .   
The structural model is estimated using a range of plausible values for a .  The 
lower bound on trade cost due to inspections is set at the average per kilogram cost of 
fumigating vegetables by methyl bromide.  The upper bound on total trade cost due to 
inspections is set at 1 percent of the average domestic price of the imported 
commodity.  Using a price-wedge approach, Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) estimate 
ad valorem equivalents of technical barriers to trade on Japanese imports of US 
apples which range between 39 percent and 60 percent for the years 2000 through 
2002.  The ad valorem equivalent derived in Yue, Beghin, and Jensen includes 
compliance costs due to harvesting, packing, and shipping requirements as well as 
any border costs incurred.  Liu and Yue (2009) estimate ad valorem tariff equivalents 
for cut flower imports (which are highly perishable) into Japan to range from 81 
percent to 94 percent for the years 2002 through 2007.  Given the large ad valorem 
equivalent estimates reported in these studies, an upper bound on total trade cost due 
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to inspections of 1 percent of domestic price seems reasonable.  Estimating the model 
over a range of values for a  permits a sensitivity analysis of the parameter estimates.   
In the context of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, the total import 
tax can be rewritten as the sum of a user feeu and the ad valorem tariff .  For the 
purposes of the empirical analysis, I assume that the user fee is set to recover 
inspection cost so that, on average, u kI .  This assumption implies that, on the 
margin, cost recovery does not influence the inspection agency’s choice of inspection 
intensity of an individual commodity during a given week.  This is consistent with US 
agricultural border inspections, where the cost of inspecting agricultural commodities 
is recovered through a user fee charged on a per shipment basis, independent of the 
inspection effort expended on any particular shipment (GAO 2008).16  The total cost 
of inspecting imports is therefore recovered by total user fees collected throughout the 
year.    
Agricultural commodities arriving at US ports of entry are subjected to a 
physical inspection if they are thought to potentially harbor NIS.  Within a 
commodity, assessment of NIS risk may also be based on country of origin and 
within a certain country of origin, by particular growers and/or shippers.  The US 
operates a number of pre-clearance and precautionary treatment programs and a 
number of vegetable commodities imported from Mexico are included in the NARP 
(formerly the Border Cargo Release Program).  Shipments entering as a part of the 
NARP are considered low-risk shipments and are often tied to specific growers in 
Mexico.  Since the expected infection rate of these imports is low, imports entering 
                                                 
16 The inspection fee is $492 per arrival; $110 for the arrival of cargo laden in Canada or Mexico 
(GAO 2008).  APHIS collects user fees on behalf of CBP.  APHIS transfers a portion of the user fees 
back to CBP based on an estimate of the cost of inspecting non-propagative agricultural commodities. 
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under the NARPP are subject to compliance (rather than surveillance) monitoring and 
are thus physically inspected at a lower frequency.  For the purposes of the empirical 
analysis, I assume the total import volume of a given commodity is divided into two 
groups: the volume of low-risk imports that are inspected infrequently because they 
enter under a special program, denoted  Lm p , and the volume of high-risk imports 
that are inspected routinely on arrival, denoted  Hm p , where 
     H Lm p m p m p  .  The rate at which low risk imports are inspected is low, so 
I treat them as not being inspected at all. 
 Incorporating these assumptions into the theoretical framework, equation 
(3.1.1) is rewritten according to the following steps.  First, substitute in u kI  and 
substitute  Hm p  for the high risk inspected imports      H Lm p m p m p  :  




dp dp m dp m dp
m k h m y q h
dI dI p dI p dI
            
 
 
where the impact of inspection effort on the price of inspected imports is fully passed 
through to the price of imports which are not inspected as well as the price of 
















substitute the marginal impact on total trade costs due to inspections with 
 1I Ib fh aq h   : 
(3.1.4) 
  
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Finally, substitute for the world price Wp p ah   : 
(3.1.5) 
  




H k q hm p ah p p y p
q h
m aq h m
   
   
   
           
. 
The first order condition presented in equation (3.1.5) serves as the basis for the 
reduced form and structural econometric analyses that follow. 
   
3.3 Econometric Specification     
This section will present reduced form and structural form specifications of 
equation (3.1.5).  A description of the data is presented in the following chapter.  The 
models are estimated for five categories of vegetable imports into the US, including 
bean/pea, broccoli/cauliflower, onion, pepper, and tomato using three years of weekly 
data.  The econometric specifications are based on observable variables, including the 
detection rate, total import volume, inspected import volume, shipments of domestic 
production, the domestic import price, and the tariff rate.  Seasonal trade elasticities, 
where season is defined by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the US, are estimated 
separately.     
 Although the detection rate is observed as an outcome of the inspection 
process, the expected infection rate is not observed.  Observing an expected infection 
rate would require a set of observations based on randomly conducted inspections 
with sufficient coverage over time and across US ports.  APHIS does conduct more 
thorough random inspection of agricultural imports through its Agricultural 
Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM) program.  However, this data is 
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unavailable and the coverage of AQIM both across ports and across commodities is 
not complete.   
The expected damage due to admitted NIS is also unobserved.  As described 
in the theoretical model, expected damage per admitted pest captures the probability 
that a damaging pest becomes established in the importing country.  It therefore 
includes the extent of the range over which NIS may become established as well as 
the damage within that range.  APHIS has conducted a small number of commodity-
specific risk assessments primarily dealing with imported commodities that have been 
subject to recent regulatory action, such as avocado imports from Mexico or 
clementine imports from Spain.  These risk assessments provide qualitative, rather 
than quantitative, assessments of potential damage.  APHIS has conducted a number 
of pest-specific risk assessments.  Once again, these assessments assess potential 
damage in a qualitative manner and do not rank the susceptibility of specific 
commodities.   
 
3.3.1 Reduced Form Specification 
The econometric analysis begins with a reduced form specification based on 
the model developed in the previous section.  As mentioned above, the observed 
variables include commodity-specific weekly observations of the detection rate, the 
import penetration ratio, the share of imports inspected, the domestic price, the tariff 
rate, and seasonal estimates of import demand and export supply elasticities.  In 
previous political economy trade models, import demand elasticities have played an 
important role in identifying political economy parameters.  These studies are cross-
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sectional analyses conducted at the industry level, typically manufacturing.  
Identification of the political economy parameters relies on an assumption that the 
government places equal weight on the welfare of different sectors within the 
industry.   
This study assesses the determinants of a non-tariff barrier implemented to 
address an expected NIS externality that is unobserved.  I control for the major source 
of unobserved heterogeneity in the expected infection rate and expected NIS damage 
by conducting the analysis at the commodity level.  Further, conducting a commodity 
specific analysis allows the political economy variables to vary by commodity.   
The reduced form model is guided by the implicit expression for inspection 
intensity written in equation (3.1.5).  The detection rate is the dependent variable and 
the inverse import penetration ratio, the inverse import demand elasticity, the 
domestic price of imports, the inverse export supply elasticity, the tariff rate, and the 
share of total imports inspected are the independent variables.  The reduced form 
model is written as follows: 
(3.2.1) , ,, 1 2 3 4 , 5 6 , 7 ,
, , , ,
1 1 Hc t c t
c t c c c c c t c c c t c c t




        
 
         
where ,c t is an error term, c denotes commodity, and t denotes week.  Note that this 
analysis assumes the infection rate, NIS damages, the weight on domestic producer 
surplus, inspection costs, and the trade costs due to inspections are constant for each 
commodity.  The model is estimated both with and without a winter dummy variable 
in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which may be due to potential 
variation in the realized infection rate as well as expected damage.   
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Predicted signs on these coefficients are derived as follows.  In Chapter 2, the 
implicit expression for optimal inspection intensity was written in terms of adjusted-
marginal-cost-adjusted-net-marginal-benefit (see equation (2.3.6)).  Ignoring the 
assumption that    ,b I bh I q , the implicit expression for optimal inspection 
intensity presented in equation (3.1.5) can be rewritten as follows: 
(3.2.2)
   
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                          
 
where the left hand side represents the adjusted marginal cost and the left hand side 
represents the adjusted net marginal benefit of an additional unit of inspection 
intensity.   




.  Examination of equation (3.2.2) indicates that an increase in the 
inverse import penetration ratio decreases the marginal cost and increases the net 
marginal benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity.  Since the detection rate 
is increasing in inspection intensity, all else equal, we expect that an increase in the 
inverse import penetration ratio will increase the detection rate.   
 The reduced form regressions control for variation in domestic prices.  Note 




.  In general, the domestic price may have a positive or negative 
impact on inspection intensity.  The expected sign of the coefficient on domestic price 
is therefore ambiguous.      
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 The inverse import demand elasticity and inverse export supply elasticity are 
included in the reduced form model to control for seasonal variation in the 
responsiveness of domestic price to policy instruments.  Note that an increase in the 
inverse import demand elasticity or an increase in the inverse export supply elasticity 








.  The 
impacts of both inverse elasticities on the adjusted marginal cost and adjusted 
marginal net benefit of an additional unit of inspection intensity are therefore 
ambiguous.  For example, an increase in the inverse import demand elasticity or an 
increase in the inverse export supply elasticity decreases the terms of trade and 
increases the political economy motives for inspection intensity.  Given this 
ambiguity, the coefficients on the inverse import demand elasticity and the inverse 
export supply elasticity may be positive or negative.    
A cursory examination of equation (3.2.2) indicates that an increase in the 
tariff increases the marginal cost and decreases the net marginal benefit of an 
additional unit of inspection intensity.  This suggests that the two policy instruments 
are substitutes and the inspection agency will choose to inspect those imports with 




function of the tariff and, as shown in the theoretical model, the response of 
inspection intensity to an increase in the tariff rate may be positive or negative 
depending on the initial level of the tariff rate.  Therefore, the reduced form 
coefficient on the tariff rate may be positive or negative.   
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 Finally, the share of imports that are inspected, 
Hm
m
, is included in the 
reduced form model.  Since this variable reflects variation in the source (either 
country of origin or grower) of imports, it serves as a proxy for potential variation in 
the infection rate.  Examination of equation (3.2.2) indicates that an increase in the 
share of imports inspected increases the marginal cost and also increases the marginal 
benefit due to an additional unit of inspection intensity and will therefore have an 
ambiguous impact on the detection rate.  As a consequence, the coefficient on the 
share of imports that are inspected may be positive or negative. 
 The reduced form specification presented in this section permits an analysis of 
the correlations between the detection rate and the observed variables in the model.  
Since the primary objective of the empirical analysis is to examine the use of border 
inspections as a distortionary tool, the relationship between the detection rate and the 
inverse import penetration ratio is of particular interest.  In the following section I 
propose a structural specification of the model that identifies the implied weight the 
inspection agency places on domestic producers relative to consumers and other 
components of the social welfare function.  Additionally, the structural model 
identifies expected NIS damage as implied by the actions of the inspection agency.    
   
3.3.2 Structural Specification 
A structural model based on the first order condition for optimal inspection 
intensity is specified in this section.  The structural analysis explicitly controls for the 
relationships among the variables as suggested by the theoretical model and is 
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specified as follows.  The inspection agency’s implicit choice of inspection intensity 
– described by the expression in equation (3.1.5) – of commodity c  during week t  is 
written as a function of the observed variables and parameters: 
(3.3.1) 
     
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θ
 
where  G θ is a generalized residual, the observed variables are contained in square 
brackets, and the parameters are outside of the square brackets.  A range of plausible 
values of the parameter a  are imposed on the model and θ denotes the 4 1  vector of 
commodity-specific parameters to be estimated: 










Note that this assumes that the infection rate, expected damage per admitted pest, 
weight on domestic producer surplus, inspection cost, and trade cost due inspections 
are constant for each commodity.  Consistent estimates of the parameters in (3.3.2) 
are obtained by the generalized method of moments (GMM).  A set of population 
moment conditions is derived using instrumental variables Z , which are orthogonal to 
the residual  G θ  such that:17 
                                                 
17 Identification of the expected infection rate parameter relies on an assumption that the inspection 
agency has an unbiased estimate of the expected infection rate which is constant throughout the year.  
The observed detection rate is the outcome of inspection intensity, ,c tI and realizations of the infection 
rate which can be written as ,c c tq  , where ,c t  represents random variation around the expected 
infection rate and , 0c tE     .  Since ,c t enters the error term, I use a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-robust variance-covariance matrix as described in the text.   
 77 
 
(3.3.3)  ' 0E G   Z θ  
where E is the expectation operator and the T k  matrix Z consists of a set of 
predetermined variables in  G θ .  Provided that 4k  , the GMM estimator is defined 
by: 
(3.3.4)     arg min 'T T T Tg g
θ
θ θ W θ  









 θ Z θ  and TW  is a k k positive semi definite weighting 
matrix.  I use the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust variance-covariance 
matrix as proposed by Newey and West (1987).18   
As described above, the econometric analysis is restricted to five vegetable 
commodities including broccoli/cauliflower, beans/peas, onion, pepper, and tomato.  
Estimating a separate model for each commodity controls for heterogeneity in the 
expected infection rate and expected NIS damage across commodities.  For each of 
the vegetable commodities, I estimate four different models corresponding to 
different assumed trade costs due to inspections a .  In addition, two alternative sets of 
instrumental variables are used.  This implies that a total of forty models are 
estimated: five commodities four assumed trade costs two sets of instrumental 
variables.  In addition, twenty models that allow for seasonal heterogeneity in the 
expected damage, infection rate, and inspection cost parameters are estimated using 
                                                 
18 The estimated weighting matrix is obtained by a two-step procedure.  In the first step, starting 
values for the parameter vector and the weighting matrix are used to obtain a consistent variance-
covariance matrix estimate by the Newey and West (1987) method.  A Bartlett kernel with a 
bandwidth of 4 is used.  In the second step, the consistent estimate of the weighting matrix from the 
previous step is used to obtain updated estimates of the weighting matrix and parameters.  This second 
step is iterated until convergence criteria are met.  The iterated procedure is performed in Matlab using 
code adapted from Kyriakoulis (http://www.kostaskyriakoulis.com/gmmgui.html). 
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the set of nonlinear instrumental variables interacted with winter and summer season 
dummies.   
 
Nonlinear instruments 
The first set of instruments consists of a constant and nonlinear combinations 
of the observed values lagged one and two years (52 and 104 weeks) such that:  
(3.3.5) 
, 52 , 52 , 104 , 104 , 52 , 52 , 52
, 52 , , 104 , , ,
, 104 , 104 , 104 , 52 , 104
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where ,c t jz  denotes the average value of the variable ,c tz  computed over the weeks 
1, ,and 1j j j  .  The lagged values are constructed using three week averages in 
order to smooth out short-term fluctuations in prices and quantities.   
Since these instruments are predetermined at time t  they satisfy the 
orthogonality condition.  Further, they are correlated with the elements of  θG θ .  
Since they are observed for a number of years outside of the sample period, lagged 
values of the domestic price, the tariff rate, and the inverse import penetration ratio 
are available.  An assumption of the empirical analysis is that the seasonal export 
supply and import demand elasticities are constant across years.  This, combined with 
the fact that the elasticities are estimated based on 1993 through 2004 calendar year 
data, implies the elasticities used in this analysis are predetermined for fiscal years 
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lagged one and two years (52 
and 104 weeks) such that:  
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where ,c t jz  denotes the average value of the variable ,c tz  computed over the weeks 
1, ,and 1j j j  .  As with the previous set of instruments, these instruments are 
predetermined and satisfy the orthogonality conditions.  Compared to the set of 
nonlinear instruments, the set of linear instruments is less correlated with  θG θ and 
as a consequence the parameter estimates, although consistent, are less efficient.  This 
set of instruments is used in order to assess the robustness of the parameter estimates 
using the nonlinear set of instruments.   
 
Terms of Trade 
The implicit expression for inspection intensity presented in equation (3.3.1) 
includes estimates of finite export supply elasticities and therefore incorporates a 
terms of trade motive into the determination of inspection intensity.  A competing 
behavioral model would suggest that market power, or the terms of trade motive, is 
not an important determinant of inspection intensity – this is equivalent to imposing 
an assumption that   .  Under this assumption, the implicit expression for optimal 
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θ is based on an 
alternative set of instruments, once again imposing the assumption that   :  
(3.3.8) 
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Strictly speaking, this model restricts the behavior of the inspection agency to 
that of a small importer and is therefore nested in the more general model that allows 
for a terms of trade motive.  Note, however, that the restricted model has the same 
number of parameters and moment conditions as the unrestricted model and standard 
hypothesis tests based on restrictions on the parameters of the model do not apply.  
Further, the moment conditions cannot be partitioned into subsets corresponding to 
the terms of trade and the non-terms of trade determinants of optimal inspection 
intensity.  This implies that a likelihood ratio-type hypothesis test based on nested 
moment conditions – as suggested by Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) – is 
not applicable.  Rather than conducting formal nested hypothesis tests, the two 
competing models are evaluated based on the over-identifying restrictions imposed by 
the two models.  Eichenbaum (1989) conducts a similar evaluation of production 




Interpretation of Structural Parameters  
Once again, the objective of this empirical analysis is to examine the use of 
border inspections as a trade-distorting instrument.  Given this objective, the primary 
parameter of interest is the implied weight the inspection agency places on domestic 
producer welfare , relative to other components of the social welfare function.  A 
weight greater than one suggests that the inspection agency places greater value on a 
dollar of producer surplus as compared to a dollar of consumer surplus (and other 
components of welfare).  An estimated weight that cannot be distinguished from one 
implies that the inspection agency is not using inspections in a distortionary manner.  
It also follows that an estimated weight less than one implies the inspection agency 
places less weight on domestic producer welfare relative to other components of the 
social welfare function.   
 The estimated weight on domestic producer surplus identifies the use of 
border inspections as a distortionary policy instrument, conditional on an expected 
level of NIS damage.  An outcome of the structural model is an estimate of expected 
NIS damage q .  This parameter captures a revealed expectation of NIS damage, 
which may be influenced by lobbying by environmental and agricultural producer 
groups, implied by the behavior of the inspection agency.  Since inspection intensity 
is positive for the set of commodities considered in this analysis, we expect the 
inspection agency to behave as if expected NIS damage is positive, which 
implies 0q  .  Estimates of expected damage close to or equal to zero for any one 
commodity category suggest that the inspection agency perceives potential damage 




3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Both reduced form and structural models are presented in this chapter.  The 
following chapter presents a description of the data used to estimate these models.  
Predicted signs on the reduced form coefficients are derived directly from the theory.  
With the exception of the inverse import penetration ratio, the predicted signs on the 
reduced form coefficients are ambiguous.  Interpreting these coefficients within the 
context of the theory is therefore difficult.   
As mentioned in the review of the empirical trade literature at the beginning 
of this chapter, a number of previous studies – in particular empirical tests of the 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Bandyopadhyay 
and Gawande 2000) – often examine the formation of non-tariff barriers.  These 
analyses estimate structural parameters using measures of the stringency of non-tariff 
barriers to trade based on theoretical models of tariff formation.  As presented in this 
chapter, the predictions of a model of tariff formation do not necessarily carry over to 
models of non-tariff barriers.  In contrast, the structural model presented in this 
chapter is derived directly from a theoretical model of border inspections.         
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4. Description of the Data 
 
In this chapter, I describe the data used in the econometric analysis.  The 
estimation uses 156 weekly observations of commodity-level variables spanning 
fiscal year 2005 thru fiscal year 2007.  Weekly observed variables include detections 
of NIS, domestic prices, tariff rates, shipments of domestic production, the volume of 
total imports, and the volume of inspected imports.  Seasonal import demand and 
export supply elasticities are estimated based on the method introduced by Feenstra 
(1994).   
The analysis proceeds in two stages.  First, seasonal/quarterly import demand 
and export supply elasticities are estimated based on the method developed by 
Feenstra (1994).  In the second stage, trade elasticity estimates are combined with US 
border inspection and trade/production data to evaluate the border inspection model.   
 
4.1 Trade Elasticity Estimates 
Recent work in the empirical trade literature has developed a methodology for 
estimating trade elasticities using data readily available in international trade 
databases.  The method, introduced by Feenstra (1994) and further developed by 
Broda and Weinstein (2006), estimates trade elasticities given an assumption that 
elasticities are constant across supplying countries as well as time.  Elasticity 
estimates are based on annual observations of import prices and import volumes 
differentiated by country of origin.  The data is first-differenced with respect to time 
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and a reference country; this eliminates effects which are constant across time and 
exporters.   
Since import prices and import quantities are endogenous variables, 
identification of import demand and export supply elasticities relies on exogenous 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the variance and covariance of the differenced import 
price and import quantity variables.  This is an application of ‘identification through 
heteroskedasticity’ as described by Rigobon (2003) – identification is achieved under 
the assumption that relative shocks to import demand and export supply across 
trading partners are uncorrelated.19   
For the purposes of the current empirical analysis, quarterly or seasonal trade 
elasticity estimates are derived for each of the commodity categories listed above.  
Quarterly or seasonal elasticity estimates capture different import demand and export 
supply conditions which may exist due to variation in consumer preferences through 
the course of a year as well as variation in domestic and foreign growing seasons.  
The definition of season corresponds to seasonal classifications as defined in the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the US.  In cases where the HTS classification 
of commodities does not vary by season of entry, quarterly elasticities are estimated.  
Estimation of trade elasticites is based on monthly observations of import price and 
import volumes differentiated by country of origin for the period 1993 thru 2004 as 
provided by the US International Trade Commission (USITC).20  Between 1993 and 
                                                 
19 Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) provide detailed descriptions 
of the methodology introduced by Feenstra (1994).    
20 In some instances the Feenstra (1994) method generates elasticity estimates of the wrong sign.  In 
these cases, Broda and Weinstein (2006) perform a grid search over a restricted set of parameters, such 
that the import demand elasticity does not exceed 132.  I also adopt this approach; and 1/   are 
restricted to be less than 132 and 0.0079 respectively. 
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2004, 33 countries exported tomatoes, 64 countries exported peppers, 49 countries 
exported onions, 27 countries exported beans/peas, and 15 countries exported 
broccoli/cauliflower to the US.  I follow Feenstra (1994) and choose the largest 
exporter, Mexico in all commodity categories, as the reference country.   
Recent estimates of trade elasticities suggest that the export supply of fruit and 
vegetable commodities is relatively inelastic as compared to other imports (including 
manufactured goods).  Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) report annual US export 
supply elasticity estimates for seven of the eight commodity categories analyzed in 
this paper.  When compared to all commodity groups (including manufacturing and 
agricultural), Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) find that the onion and 
broccoli/cauliflower categories fall into the highly inelastic export supply category 
and the bean/pea category falls into the medium export supply elasticity category.  
Bagwell and Staiger (2006) find that vegetable products are among the lowest export 
supply elasticity sectors, with the minerals, plastics, and chemicals sectors having the 
highest export supply elasticity.21   
The estimated export supply elasticities reported in Table 1 are somewhat 
higher than those reported in Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008).  Since I estimate 
seasonal/quarterly export supply elasticities, the results are not directly comparable.  
Examining the elasticities reported in Table 1, there is significant variation across 
seasons within each of the commodity categories.  In general, within each of the 
                                                 
21 The Bagwell and Staiger (2006) results are for 16 of the 21 countries which joined the WTO 
between January 1, 1995 and November of 2005.  They find that “Live Animals; Animal Products”, 
“Vegetable Products”, and “Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared 
Edible Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes” have the lowest export supply elasticities of the sectors in 
their analysis.  Bagwell and Staiger attribute these results to the regional nature of trade in these 
products – as a rough check of this hypothesis they find that the number of importer-competing 
countries is 6 percent lower for animal and vegetable products and the number of export-source 
countries is 48 percent lower when compared to mineral/chemical/plastic products. 
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commodity categories, export supply to the US tends to be more elastic in the 
summer months and less elastic in the winter months.  In terms of import demand, 
there appears to be less variability across seasons within the broccoli/cauliflower, 
bean/pea, and onion commodity categories.  The import demand elasticities in the 
tomato and pepper categories tend to be higher than in the other categories.   
 
Table 1: Elasticity estimates 
Commodity Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 4 























































































* Standard errors in parentheses 
 
4.2 Data 
Border Inspection and Detections of Actionable NIS 
Daily observations of the outcome of inspections of US fruit and vegetable 
imports were obtained from the PPQ280 database maintained by the Plant Protection 
and Quarantine (PPQ) division of APHIS.  The PPQ280 database provides a detailed 
record of daily arrivals of non-propagative (fruit, vegetables, and cut flowers) and 
propagative (nursery stock) agricultural commodities at US ports of entry.  
Commodity name, import volume, import volume inspected, country of origin, port 
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of entry, and the disposition of imports are recorded.  The final disposition record 
documents which shipments were physically inspected and the outcome of each 
inspection.  The status of imports which enter the US under special programs, such as 
pre-clearance programs, precautionary treatment programs, or the NARP, is also 
indicated in the disposition record.  See Appendix B for a list of disposition codes 
used in the PPQ280 database as well as a definition of each disposition code.     
For each commodity, total inspected volume, Hm , includes all imports of the 
commodity that are inspected under the normal surveillance program.  The inspected 
import volume therefore excludes shipments which enter under special import 
programs such as precautionary treatment programs, pre-clearance programs, and the 
NARP.  The inspected import volume therefore includes shipments entering under the 
following disposition codes: DEAP, FUAP, FUPQ, IRMR, IRPD, OTAP, OTPQ, 
RXAP, and RXPQ.   
A ‘detection’ is defined as any record indicating that an actionable pest was 
detected as well as those records which indicate that action was taken prior to final 
determination of the actionable status of a detected pest.  Total detections therefore 
include all instances where imports were treated, destroyed, or re-exported due to 
detection of an actionable or a potentially actionable pest.  Shipments entering under 
the following disposition codes are used to construct the weekly import volume with 






Total Import Volume 
Total imported volume, m , includes all imports of the commodity admitted 
into the US for consumption, and therefore excludes those shipments that arrived at 
US ports of entry that were in-transit to another country or were re-exported for a 
reason other than detection of an actionable pest (entries with the following 
disposition codes are excluded from the import volume total: DEPP, DPRP, ENPE, 
ESRC, IEND, ITNE, RXPC, RXPD, RXPP, RXPQ, RXWP, and TEOC).   
Prior to 2007, imports of Canadian grown fruits and vegetables were exempt 
from border inspection.  The PPQ280 database reflects this; a majority of fruit and 
vegetable imports from Canada are not recorded in the PPQ 280 data.  The Fruit and 
Vegetable Market Report (FVMR) database maintained by the Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) of the USDA records total production in Canada, rather 
than imports into the US, and cannot be used to construct import volumes.  I construct 
weekly import volumes of Canadian grown commodities based on monthly trade data 
(averaged across all days in a month) provided by the Foreign Agricultural Trade of 
the US (FATUS) database.  
As mentioned above, the PPQ280 database records daily outcomes of 
inspections as well as daily import volumes.  This is true with the exception of the 
ports of Nogales, Arizona and Otay Mesa, California.  These two ports record import 
volumes associated with interceptions of actionable pests on a daily basis but record 
all other import volumes on the first of each month (for example, import volume for 
the full month of January is recorded on January 1).  The FVMR database is based on 
daily import volumes reported to them directly by APHIS.  I construct weekly import 
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volumes for Nogales and Otay Mesa as follows.  I use the FVMR database to 
calculate the percentage of imports entering on each day.  Next I construct a daily 
import volume based on the monthly import volume recorded in the PPQ280 database 
multiplied by the percentage of imports entering each day according to the FVMR 
database.  The daily import volume I construct is then aggregated into a weekly 
import volume total.   
 
Domestic Production 
The FVMR database records daily movement of domestically produced fruit 
and vegetable commodities net of exports, recorded by volume.  I use this data to 
construct weekly domestic production for domestic consumption y  for each of the 
commodity categories.  The lag between harvest and shipment is unknown.  Domestic 
movement data records daily shipments originating from each of the domestic 
growing regions.  Shipments are therefore a function of total harvested volume as 
well as market conditions such as the volume and price of imported commodities.     
 
Import Tariff 
US tariffs on fruit and vegetable imports vary by country of origin and, in the 
case of the more perishable fruits and vegetables, by season of entry.  Tariff rates are 
obtained from the US ITC online database.  Weekly average tariff rates   for each 
commodity are computed based on collected duties weighted by import volumes from 





The domestic price is constructed based on the FVMR terminal market 
database which records daily prices at wholesale produce markets in 15 major US 
cities.  The FVMR database records daily high and low prices for each variety, grade, 
type of package, and origin (country of origin for imported produce and US growing 
region for domestic production) at US wholesale markets.  The domestic price of 
imports therefore includes customs, insurance and freight value (CIF) at the port of 
entry, import charges and costs at the border (including tariffs and user fees), the cost 
of transporting from the US port of entry to the wholesale market, as well as any 
marketing margins up to the point of sale in the wholesale market.   
I compute national average weekly domestic import prices p  for each 
commodity category as follows.  First, an average weekly price is computed for each 
variety (within a commodity category) and country of origin combination; the 
average is constructed across variety, grade, and package type.  Second, a weighted 
average domestic price of imports is computed based on the weekly volume of 
imports by variety and country of origin.       
 
Trade Costs due to Border Inspections 
A lower bound on the trade costs due to inspections a  is derived from 
personal interviews conducted with private fumigation companies in New York, 
Philadelphia, Nogales, Long Beach, and San Diego.  These estimates capture the 
price paid to private fumigation companies to treat commodities with methyl 
bromide.  The estimates therefore do not include costs due to product deterioration or 
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overtime and other charges for services provided by APHIS staff.22  Based on these 
interviews, the average fumigation cost ranges from $0.10/kilogram to 
$0.20/kilogram.                  
 
Variables and Summary Statistics 
The weekly detection rate ( , )h I q  is constructed for each commodity based on 
the weekly volume of imports with detections divided by the total weekly volume of 
inspected imports Hm .  The detection rate therefore captures the probability of 
finding at least one actionable NIS per kilogram of inspected imports.  The weekly 
ratio of inspected import volume to total import volume 
Hm
m
 for each commodity is 
also constructed.  The inverse import penetration ratio is computed based on the 




.  The domestic price and import tariff variables are computed as 
described above. 
Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis are presented in Table 2.  
Mean detection rates for these commodities are low, ranging from 0.3 percent in the 
pepper category to 1.7 percent in the onion category.  Import volumes are highest in 
the tomato, pepper, and onion categories.  The fraction of imports that are physically 
inspected varies across commodities.  Approximately 90 percent of the total volume 
                                                 
22 Product deterioration due to methyl bromide fumigation varies by commodity.  Approximately 84 
percent of Red Delicious apples are marketable after fumigation (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster 2008).  
Methyl bromide fumigation of citrus can cause fruit losses of up to 60 percent (Lynch 2001).  For the 
six vegetable commodities in this analysis product loss of 15 percent due to fumigation would imply a 




of broccoli/cauliflower and bean/pea shipments is physically inspected, 50 percent of 
pepper import volume is inspected, and roughly 20 percent of onion import volume 
and tomato import volume is physically inspected.  There is significant variation in 
import penetration and prices across these commodity categories.  Import penetration 
and import prices are highest in the pepper, tomato, and bean/pea categories.  The 
tariff rates applied to these vegetable imports are low due to the fact that the majority 
of these commodities are imported from NAFTA member countries.  
 






Onion Pepper Tomato 
1.3% 1.3% 1.7% 0.3% 0.8% 
Detection rate, h  
(1.6) (1.7) (2.6) (0.6) (2.6) 
1,713 1,323 4,346 10,600 17,700 Total imports 
(1,000 kg), m  (894) (641) (3,437) (3,598) (8,844) 
1,521 1,151 861 5,244 2,951 Inspected imports 
(1,000 kg), Hm  (938) (609) (1,114) (5,055) (2,671) 
7.78 1.95 13.05 0.985 1.99 Inverse import  
penetration, y m  (4.88) (1.35) (11.17) (0.571) (1.03) 
1.91 4.45 1.27 3.18 2.39 Domestic import  
price ($/kg), p  (0.39) (0.738) (0.507) (0.490) (0.638) 
0.0008 0.0004 0.004 0.008 0.0004 Average tariff rate 
($/kg),   (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) 







This chapter presents results for both the reduced form and structural models.  
The reduced form estimates are presented first, grouped by commodity category.  The 
structural results are presented next.  I present results of the terms of trade model with 
nonlinear instruments as well as linear instruments.  The structural model is also 
estimated assuming no terms of trade motive.  The chapter concludes with structural 
estimation results accounting for seasonal heterogeneity.       
 
5.1 Reduced Form Results 
As presented in the chapter outlining the empirical framework, the reduced 
form specification is based on equation (3.2.1).  To control for potential unobserved 
heterogeneity in the infection rate and/or expected marginal damage across seasons, 
the reduced form model is estimated both with and without a winter season dummy 
variable.  Both of these models are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and the 




 The reduced form results for the tomato category are presented in Table 3.  
First, the coefficient on the inverse import penetration ratio is positive and 
statistically significant at least at the five percent level in all four models.  This result 
is consistent with the comparative static prediction – an increase in the inverse import 
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penetration ratio increases the detection rate – and robust to inclusion of the winter 
dummy variable.  Since the comparative static prediction relies on an assumption that 
1  , these coefficient estimates suggest that the inspection agency places greater 
weight on the welfare of domestic tomato producers relative to domestic tomato 
consumers.   
 
Table 3: Reduced Form Tomato Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
0.010* 0.013* 0.010* 0.012** y
m
 
(0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0045) 
0.0026 0.0025 0.0027 0.0029 p  
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0020) 
-0.036 -0.038 -0.037 -0.069 1

 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.041) (0.056) 
-0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.011* 1

 
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0048) 
-1.15 -2.76 -1.13 -2.17   
(0.90) (1.63) (0.90) (1.54) 
-0.030** -0.014 -0.030** -0.014 Hm
m
 (0.011) (0.0081) (0.011) (0.0081) 
  -0.00031 -0.0072 
Winter 
  (0.0062) (0.0086) 
-0.0042 -0.017 -0.0038 -0.0080 
Constant 
(0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0064) (0.0095) 
Sigma:     
 0.025***  0.025*** 
  Constant 
 (0.0068)  (0.0068) 
N 156 156 156 156 
2R  0.248  0.248  
Adjusted- 2R  0.217  0.212  
Pseudo- 2R   -0.096  -0.098 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 




The coefficient on domestic price is positive and statistically insignificant in 
all four models, while the coefficient on the inverse import demand elasticity is 
negative and also statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on the inverse export 
supply elasticity is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level in all 
four models.  This indicates that the detection rate tends to decrease during seasons 
when the US has greater market power in the tomato import market.  As pointed out 
Chapter 3, under the assumptions of the model of border inspection, the sign of the 
coefficient on the inverse export supply elasticity cannot be determined a priori.  
However, the statistical significance of this coefficient provides evidence that terms 
of trade considerations do influence inspection intensity. 
The coefficient on the tariff rate is negative but is not statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  This provides weak evidence that detections tend to 
increase when the average tariff rate is lower.  The coefficient on the share of imports 
inspected is negative in all four models and statistically significant at least at the five 
percent level in the two OLS regressions.  A negative coefficient implies that the 
detection rate decreases as the share of imports inspected increases.  According to a 
strict interpretation of the theoretical model, a negative coefficient implies that the 
cost of inspection exceeds marginal NIS damage avoided, Ik h .  The coefficient 
on the winter dummy variable is statistically insignificant – evidence that, all else 
equal, the detection rate associated with tomato imports does not vary by season of 




 Table 4 presents reduced form estimation results for the pepper category.  
First, note that the coefficient on the inverse import penetration ratio is positive but 
statistically insignificant in all four models.  These coefficient estimates therefore 
provide weak evidence that the weight on domestic producer surplus is greater than 
one. 
 
Table 4: Reduced Form Pepper Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
0.000086 0.00021 0.00011 0.00023 y
m
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
0.00097 0.0010 0.00095 0.00099 p  
(0.00090) (0.00093) (0.00093) (0.00096) 
0.0074 0.0076 0.0078 0.0080 1

 
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
0.000037 0.000043 0.000015 0.000021 1

 
(0.000081) (0.000095) (0.000072) (0.000096) 
-0.029 -0.022 -0.025 -0.018   
(0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.091) 
0.0014 0.0020 0.0018 0.0024 Hm
m
 (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0033) 
  0.00039 0.00038 
Winter 
  (0.00088) (0.00094) 
-0.0025 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0037 
Constant 
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0025) 
Sigma:     
 0.0057**  0.0057** 
  Constant 
 (0.0021)  (0.0021) 
N 156 156 156 156 
2R  0.051  0.051  
Adjusted- 2R  0.013  0.006  
Pseudo- 2R   -0.008  -0.008 
Note: Standard errors presented in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance 




The coefficients on the domestic price, the inverse import demand elasticity, 
and the export supply elasticity are also positive and statistically insignificant in all 
four models.  Note that the signs on all of these coefficients are robust to inclusion of 
the winter dummy variable.  Estimated coefficients on the share of imports inspected 
and the tariff rate are statistically insignificant across all four models.  Of course, 
since the comparative static predictions are ambiguous, these results do not contradict 
the theory.  Finally, the estimated coefficient on the winter dummy variables is 
statistically insignificant in all four models.  
 
5.1.3 Onion 
 The reduced form results for the onion category are presented in Table 5 
below.  The coefficient on the inverse import penetration ratio is negative in all four 
models and statistically significant at the five percent level in the Tobit models (2) 
and (4).  Models (2) and (4) suggest that the weight on domestic producer surplus is 
less than one in the onion category – evidence that the inspection agency inspects 
onion imports in a manner that places greater weight on consumer surplus relative to 
producer surplus.   
 The coefficient on the domestic price is positive and statistically insignificant 
in all four models.  The inverse import demand elasticity is negative in all four 
models and statistically significant at the five percent level in model (3).  This 
provides evidence that detections increase in seasons when import demand is more 
elastic.  The coefficient on inverse export supply elasticity is similarly negative, but 
statistically insignificant in the four models.   
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Finally, the coefficients on the tariff rate and the share of imports inspected 
are not statistically significantly different from zero.  Once again, insignificant 
coefficient estimates on these variables do not contradict the model.  However, these 
variables provide very little in the way of explanatory power.  The winter dummy 
variable is also statistically insignificant, providing evidence that detections do not 
vary systematically by season, holding other variables constant.   
 
Table 5: Reduced Form Onion Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
-0.00033 -0.0020* -0.00035 -0.0021* y
m
 
(0.00024) (0.00097) (0.00024) (0.00095) 
0.0030 0.015 0.0036 0.018 p  
(0.0057) (0.015) (0.0058) (0.015) 
-0.050 -0.17* -0.035 -0.11 1

 
(0.031) (0.081) (0.031) (0.085) 
-0.011 -0.053 -0.0084 -0.042 1

 
(0.019) (0.053) (0.020) (0.055) 
0.033 0.56 -0.052 0.18   
(0.19) (0.60) (0.17) (0.56) 
-0.014 0.010 -0.0044 0.042 Hm
m
 (0.011) (0.033) (0.011) (0.033) 
  -0.0080 -0.030 
Winter 
  (0.0065) (0.016) 
0.036** 0.030 0.033** 0.018 
Constant 
(0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.030) 
Sigma:     
 0.071***  0.070*** 
  Constant 
 (0.0091)  (0.0092) 
N 156 156 156 156 
2R  0.022  0.030  
Adjusted- 2R  -0.018  -0.016  
Pseudo- 2R   -0.236  -0.326 
Note: Standard errors presented in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance 





 The reduced form results for the bean/pea commodity category are presented 
in Table 6.  As in the tomato and pepper categories, the coefficient on the inverse 
import penetration ratio in the bean/pea category is positive across all four models.  
These coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant in each model, providing 
weak evidence that the detection rate increases as the inverse import penetration ratio 
increases.   
 
Table 6: Reduced Form Bean/Pea Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
0.00087 0.00084 0.00080 0.00078 y
m
 
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
0.0032 0.0031 0.0034 0.0032 p  
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
-0.015 -0.020 -0.011 -0.016 1

 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 
-0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0029 1

 
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
-0.62 -0.50 -0.61 -0.50   
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
-0.039* -0.039* -0.041* -0.040* Hm
m
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
  0.0018 0.0016 
Winter 
  (0.0045) (0.0046) 
0.035 0.036 0.035 0.036 
Constant 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Sigma:     
 0.017***  0.017*** 
  Constant 
 (0.0014)  (0.0013) 
N 156 156 156 156 
2R  0.106  0.107  
Adjusted- 2R  0.070  0.065  
Pseudo- 2R   -0.023  -0.023 
Note: Standard errors presented in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance 




The coefficient on the domestic price is positive in all four models, although 
statistically insignificant.  The coefficients on inverse import demand elasticity and 
inverse export supply elasticity are negative (as they are in the tomato and onion 
categories) and statistically insignificant in all four models.   
Once again, the coefficient on the tariff rate is negative in all four models.  To 
the extent that tariffs vary by season for non-NAFTA imports, these results provide 
weak evidence that inspection intensity substitutes for the tariff rate, in the sense that 
the detection rate increases when the average tariff rate is lower.   
The coefficient on the share of imports inspected is negative and statistically 
significant at the five percent level in all models.  As in the tomato model, the 
negative coefficient suggests that the marginal cost of conducting inspections exceeds 
the marginal avoided NIS damage.  As in the previous models, the coefficient on the 
winter dummy variable is statistically insignificant.    
 
5.1.5 Broccoli/Cauliflower 
 Table 7 presents reduced form results for the broccoli/cauliflower commodity 
category.  The coefficient on the inverse import penetration ratio is positive in 
estimations (1) thru (3) and negative in estimation (4).  These estimates are 
statistically insignificant in all four models.   
Once again, the coefficient on domestic price is statistically insignificant in all 
four models.  The coefficients on the inverse import demand elasticity and the inverse 
export supply elasticity are positive and negative, respectively.  Further, these 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant in models (1) and (2) – the models 
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with the winter dummy variable.  These results indicate that detections increase 
during seasons when import demand is less elastic and export supply is more elastic.   
 
Table 7: Reduced Form Broccoli/Cauliflower Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
0.00037 0.00020 0.000058 -0.00020 y
m
 
(0.00034) (0.00044) (0.00034) (0.00044) 
-0.00032 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.00043 p  
(0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0044) (0.0059) 
0.085* 0.12* 0.013 0.019 1

 
(0.042) (0.057) (0.060) (0.077) 
-0.040** -0.055** -0.0089 -0.010 1

 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026) 
-0.39 -0.30 -0.76** -0.81*   
(0.21) (0.32) (0.29) (0.40) 
0.026* 0.039* 0.025* 0.037* Hm
m
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) 
  -0.015* -0.021* 
Winter 
  (0.0059) (0.0082) 
-0.037 -0.067* -0.0015 -0.017 
Constant 
(0.023) (0.032) (0.028) (0.038) 
Sigma:     
 0.021***  0.020*** 
  Constant 
 (0.0019)  (0.0018) 
N 156 156 156 156 
2R  0.175  0.220  
Adjusted- 2R  0.142  0.183  
Pseudo- 2R   -0.055  -0.075 
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 
significance at 1% level; *** denotes significance at 0.1% level.   
 
The coefficient on the tariff rate is negative across all four models, but is 
statistically significant in models (3) and (4) – the models with the winter dummy 
variable.  There provides weak evidence that the detection rate, and as a consequence 
inspection intensity, increases when seasonal tariff rates applied to non-NAFTA 
imports are lower.  The coefficient on the share of imports inspected is positive and 
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statistically significant across all four models.  Finally, the winter dummy variable is 
negative and statistically significant in both models (3) and (4).  This is strong 
evidence that the detection rate is lower in the winter season.  The fact that coefficient 
estimates are sensitive to inclusion of the winter dummy variable may indicate that 
the seasonal dummy is picking up unobserved heterogeneity other than expected 
damage across seasons. 
 
Summary 
 A number of conclusions can be derived from the reduced form estimations.  
First, with the exception of the onion category, the coefficient on the inverse import 
penetration ratio tends to be positive.  Overall, this provides at least weak evidence 
that the implied weight on domestic producer surplus is greater than one.  The 
evidence is strongest in the tomato category, followed by the pepper and the bean/pea 
categories.  Given these results, one would expect to find stronger evidence of 
preferential treatment of domestic tomato, pepper, and bean/pea producers in the 
structural form estimations.  Alternatively, we would expect to find that domestic 
onion producers receive less preferential treatment than the other commodities in this 
study.   
 The coefficient on domestic price is positive but statistically insignificant in 
all commodity categories, suggesting that variation in prices has little direct 
explanatory power on detection rates.  The coefficient on the inverse import demand 
elasticity also tends to be statistically insignificant, once again evidence that seasonal 
variation in import demand elasticity is not an important determinant of detection 
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rates.  The coefficient on the inverse export supply elasticity is negative in all 
commodity categories with the exception of the pepper category, and statistically 
significant in the tomato and broccoli/cauliflower categories.  This provides weak 
evidence that inspections are responsive to import market power considerations.   
There is weak evidence that the detection rate increases as the average tariff 
rates applied to imports of tomatoes, peppers, and beans/peas decrease.  By extension, 
this suggests that the inspection agency increases the intensity of inspection of these 
commodities when the average tariff applied to non-NAFTA imports is lower.  In no 
case is the coefficient on the tariff rate positive and statistically significant.   
The winter dummy variable is included in the reduced form estimations as a 
control for potential unobserved heterogeneity in the infection rate and expected 
marginal damage.  I find that inclusion of seasonal dummy variables does not 
influence the estimation results in the tomato, pepper, onion, and bean/pea categories.  
There is some evidence that season of entry is a statistically important determinant of 
the detection rate in the broccoli/cauliflower models.  In addition to the statistical 
significance of the winter dummy in the broccoli/cauliflower category, its inclusion 
influences inference on coefficient estimates for the inverse import demand elasticity, 
the inverse export supply elasticity, and the tariff rate.   
   
5.2 Structural Model Results 
In this section the model is estimated in its structural form using the two sets 
of instruments as outlined in the previous chapter.  The model is estimated using the 
iterated GMM procedure described above.  Within each commodity category, I 
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present four sets of results corresponding to different assumptions regarding trade 
cost due to inspections a .  The assumed trade cost due to inspections are 
$0.15/kilogram, $0.30/kilogram, $0.60/kilogram, and a 1 percent ad valorem 
equivalent (1% AVE).  The lower bound on trade cost due to inspections of 
$0.15/kilogram corresponds to the average cost of fumigating detected contaminated 
imports.  The average detection rates and domestic prices reported in Table 2 are used 
to compute the upper bound on trade cost due to inspections which corresponds to an 
ad valorem equivalent of 1 percent for each of the commodity categories.23  
Estimating the model over a range of trade costs provides a method of assessing the 
sensitivity of the parameter estimates to assumed trade costs due to inspections.     
 
5.2.1 Nonlinear instrumental variables 
Results from the structural form model using the set of nonlinear instruments 
described in Chapter 3 are presented in this section.  The four structural parameters 
, , , andc c c ck q   are derived from estimates of the parameters in equation (3.3.2).  
The structural parameter estimates and their associated standard errors are presented 
in Table 8.  There is little evidence against the model specification for four of the five 
models.  The J-statistic reported in Table 8 is distributed as a chi-square with three 
degrees of freedom.24  For four of the five commodity categories (tomato, pepper, 
                                                 
23 An ad valorem equivalent (AVE) should be computed on the basis of world price.  Since world price 
is unobserved in this analysis, I express the AVE on the basis of observed domestic prices.  The 1% 





   
24 Given the set of instruments used in the analysis, the model has seven moment conditions and four 
parameters.  This leaves three orthogonality restrictions that are used to test the model specification by 
Hansen’s over-identifying restrictions test (Hansen 1982).   
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bean/pea, and broccoli/cauliflower) the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test 
implies the model specification and choice of instruments cannot be rejected at the 10 
percent level.  The onion model specification cannot be rejected at approximately the 
5 percent level – thus, the evidence against the onion model is not exceptionally 
strong.   
 
Weight on Domestic Producer Surplus 
The weight on domestic producer surplus is greater than one for all five 
commodities and significantly greater than one in four of the five commodity 
categories – evidence suggesting that border inspection protocols are implemented in 
a manner that protects domestic producers from import competition, independent of 
expected NIS damage.  The estimated weight on domestic producer surplus is greatest 
in the tomato and pepper categories: estimates range from 1.48 to 1.50 in the tomato 
category and from 1.58 to 1.59 in the pepper category.  The weight on domestic 
producer surplus ranges from 1.21 to 1.23 in the bean/pea category and the weight on 
domestic producer surplus in the onion category is estimated to be 1.05.  The 
estimated weight on domestic producer surplus in the broccoli/cauliflower category is 
1.14, but this weight cannot be statistically distinguished from 1 at the 5 percent level.  
Note that for each of the commodity categories the estimated weight on domestic 
producer surplus is relatively stable across the four sets of results corresponding to 





Table 8: Parameter estimates with nonlinear instruments 













Tomato         
1   0.496*** 0.109 0.484*** 0.110 0.479*** 0.111 0.475*** 0.111 
k  0.149 0.078 0.162* 0.080 0.168* 0.082 0.188* 0.093 
q  0.022 0.012 0.022 0.012 0.022 0.011 0.022 0.011 
  6.677 3.514 7.226 3.895 7.458 4.067 7.616 4.188 
J-stat 2.306  2.109  2.058  2.043  
p-value 0.511  0.550  0.561  0.564  
Pepper         
1   0.585*** 0.060 0.585*** 0.060 0.584*** 0.060 0.578*** 0.060 
k  0.152*** 0.030 0.152*** 0.030 0.151*** 0.030 0.143*** 0.031 
q  -0.514 0.691 -0.265 0.359 -0.140 0.193 -0.025 0.050 
  -0.297 0.394 -0.576 0.768 -1.084 1.464 -5.720 10.616 
J-stat 1.927  1.945  1.978  2.444  
p-value 0.588  0.584  0.577  0.485  
Onion         
1   0.050** 0.017 0.052** 0.017 0.053** 0.017 0.053** 0.017 
k  -0.022 0.158 -0.028 0.165 -0.032 0.172 -0.033 0.174 
q  0.005 0.035 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.026 0.005 0.025 
  -4.117 2.795 -5.172 3.434 -5.975 3.903 -6.173 4.015 
J-stat 8.684  8.030  7.557  7.444  
p-value 0.034  0.045  0.056  0.059  
Beans/Peas         
1   0.225*** 0.044 0.222*** 0.043 0.219*** 0.041 0.210*** 0.026 
k  1.020 1.044 1.054 1.118 1.083 1.192 0.938 0.838 
q  0.246 0.212 0.137 0.116 0.084 0.071 0.050 0.049 
  4.163 7.644 7.707 14.383 12.892 24.609 18.650 34.439 
J-stat 0.126  0.154  0.223  0.841  
p-value 0.989  0.985  0.974  0.840  
Broccoli/Cauliflower 
1   0.136 0.089 0.136 0.089 0.136 0.090 0.135 0.090 
k  -0.815 2.038 -0.840 2.167 -0.888 2.408 -1.009 2.967 
q  2.779 16.451 1.534 9.033 0.904 5.254 0.514 2.821 
  -0.215 1.090 -0.390 1.977 -0.666 3.330 -1.182 5.582 
J-stat 0.167  0.167  0.167  0.169  
p-value 0.983  0.983  0.983  0.982  
Note: Standard errors computed by delta method; * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 





Results for the tomato and pepper categories suggest that the extent of the 
trade distortion due to border inspection can be quite high.  For instance, the 
estimated producer welfare weights imply that the welfare of domestic consumers 
(and other components of social welfare) is valued at between 63 and 68 percent of 
producer welfare.  The relatively high implicit weight placed on the income of 
domestic tomato and pepper producers is consistent with anecdotal evidence that 
these commodities are politically sensitive.  Passage of NAFTA was opposed by US 
vegetable growers due to concerns about increased competition from Mexico.  As a 
part of the NAFTA implementation, tomato and pepper imports were monitored for 
evidence of import surges thru to January 2009.  The estimated welfare weights in the 
structural analysis are also roughly consistent with reduced form coefficient estimates 
presented in the previous section.  Coefficient estimates on the inverse import 
penetration ratio were positive for both commodities and were statistically significant 
in all four of the tomato models.   
The implied weight on domestic producer surplus in the bean/pea category is 
also relatively high, implying that other components of social welfare are valued at 
approximately 82 percent of producer surplus.  This result is also consistent with the 
reduced form results, which provided weak evidence that the weight on domestic 
producer surplus is greater than one.  Similar to tomato and pepper production, US 
winter season bean/pea production is geographically concentrated in Florida (Calvin 
and Barrios 1998).  The implied weights on domestic producer surplus in the tomato, 
pepper, and the bean/pea categories are consistent with the political influence of 
Florida vegetable growers.  Further, import penetration in the tomato, pepper, and 
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bean/pea categories has increased by more than 150 percent since NAFTA 
implementation (Huang and Huang 2007).  The increase in import penetration is 
consistent with concerns expressed by US fruit and vegetable growers prior to 
NAFTA implementation.  The high estimates of producer welfare weights in these 
commodities may reflect a desire to use alternative trade barriers to protect domestic 
growers from increasing import competition.   
The estimated weight on domestic producer surplus in the onion category is 
relatively low at approximately 1.05.  This result contradicts the reduced form 
estimates, which were negative in all four models and statistically significant in two.  
This may indicate misspecification of the reduced form onion model.  On the other 
hand, as discussed above, the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test indicates that 
specification of the onion model is questionable.  In both cases, the results suggest 
that the weight on domestic producer surplus is close to one.  Import penetration in 
the onion category has remained constant since implementation of NAFTA 
suggesting that imports from Mexico have not had a significant impact on the 
competitive position of US onion growers.  This is consistent with the result that the 
weight on domestic producer surplus is relatively low in this sector. 
Finally, the weight on domestic producer surplus in the broccoli/cauliflower 
category is 1.14.  Although the parameter estimate is greater than one, it is estimated 
imprecisely, and cannot be statistically distinguished from one.   
The weights on domestic producer surplus presented in this analysis are 
within the range of previous estimates of domestic policy preference weights for 
agricultural commodities in the US and elsewhere.  Oehmke and Yao (1990) find that 
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US wheat producers receive a welfare weight of 1.43.  Ahn and Sumner (2009) report 
a national average welfare weight on US milk producers of 1.16 relative to domestic 
consumers.  Burton, Love, and Rausser (2004) find that Japanese wheat and rice 
consumers are valued at about 92 percent of Japanese wheat and rice producers 
which, in the context of this model, implies a welfare weight on domestic producers 
of approximately 1.09.   
Estimates of producer welfare weights in studies of the US manufacturing 
sector are somewhat smaller.  Goldberg and Maggi (1999) report a weight on social 
welfare of 98 percent and a weight on campaign contributions of 2 percent.  Using an 
alternative estimation strategy, Eicher and Osang (2002) report a weight on social 
welfare of 96 percent.  Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) find that the US 
government places equal weight on aggregate welfare and campaign contributions.  
Although these results provide evidence that the government does not purely 
maximize social welfare associated with trade in manufactured goods, the extent of 
the distortion appears to be small relative to the welfare weights on producer surplus 
as estimated in studies of agricultural policy.  These findings suggest that the US 
agricultural sector is more politically sensitive than the US manufacturing sector.   
 
Expected NIS Damage 
Table 9 reports expected NIS damage per kilogram of inspected imports.  
Estimates of expected NIS damage are highest in the tomato and pepper categories, 
ranging from $0.15 to $0.17 per kilogram.  Estimates of expected damage in the 
onion, bean/pea, and the broccoli/cauliflower categories cannot be distinguished from 
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zero, suggesting that expected damage due to imports of these commodities is quite 
low.  Estimated expected damage can also be expressed in terms of import values 
using the average annual prices as reported in Table 2.  For every dollar of inspected 
tomato imports, the inspection agency behaves as if expected damage ranges from 
$0.06 to $0.07.  Similarly, for every dollar of inspected pepper imports, the inspection 
agency behaves as if expected NIS damages are roughly $0.05.  These estimates 
imply that, for the set of commodities considered in this analysis, the inspection 
agency behaves as if expected damage ranges from essentially zero to $0.07 per 
dollar of imports it inspects.     
 
Table 9: Expected damage with nonlinear instruments, $/kg imports ( q ) 













Tomato 0.148 0.078 0.160* 0.079 0.165* 0.080 0.168* 0.080 
Pepper 0.153*** 0.030 0.152*** 0.030 0.152*** 0.030 0.145*** 0.033 
Onion -0.022 0.156 -0.028 0.163 -0.031 0.168 -0.033 0.170 
Bean/Pea 1.026 1.049 1.059 1.124 1.088 1.198 0.937 0.840 
Broccoli/ 
Cauliflower 
-0.597 0.771 -0.599 0.768 -0.602 0.762 -0.607 0.754 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance at 1% level; *** denotes 
significance at 0.1% level. 
 
Although not directly comparable, these results can be benchmarked against 
results from the Peterson and Orden (2008) study of US-Mexico avocado trade.  Due 
to strict US phytosanitary import requirements, US-Mexico avocado trade has been 
the subject of frequent disputes and a significant amount of research has been devoted 
to estimating the risks and costs of pest infestation due to avocado imports from 
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Mexico.  Based on this previous research, Peterson and Orden (2008) estimate pest 
control costs and damages associated with US avocado imports; they consider 
average and high pest risk situations, as well as variation in the extent of pre-export 
cleaning.  Their estimates are based on avocado-specific pests as well as the expected 
impact of fruit fly infestations on production of other susceptible agricultural 
commodities.  Assuming low pest infestation risk, they estimate NIS control and 
damage expenditures to vary from less than $0.002 per dollar of avocado imports 
(assuming significant investment in pre-export cleaning) to $0.03 per dollar of 
imports (if exporters do not invest in pre-export cleaning).  Assuming high pest risk 
and no pre-export cleaning, the maximum expected damage and control cost is $0.12 
per dollar of avocado imports.     
For both the tomato and pepper categories, estimates of expected NIS damage 
per dollar of imports are below the upper bound presented in Peterson and Orden 
(2008).  The estimated expected damage in the onion, bean/pea, and 
broccoli/cauliflower categories are essentially zero, suggesting that imports of these 
commodities are considered to be low risk.  To the extent that expected NIS damage 
is proportional to the total annual production value of the imported commodity, low 
estimates of expected NIS damage for the bean/pea and broccoli/cauliflower 
categories is consistent with the fact that the annual domestic production value of 
these commodities is relatively low.  The small estimated damage in the onion 
category – again not significantly different from zero – is somewhat surprising since 
annual domestic onion production is relatively high.  Estimated NIS damage in the 
tomato and pepper categories is higher than damage estimates in the other 
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commodities, consistent with the relatively high annual value of domestic tomato and 
pepper production.  Higher NIS damage estimates in the tomato and pepper 
categories may also reflect the political profile of domestic producers of these 
commodities.   
 
5.2.2 Linear instrumental variables 
Results from the structural model using linear instrumental variables are 
presented in this section.  The structural parameter estimates and their associated 
standard errors are presented in Table 10.  The J-statistic reported in Table 10 is 
distributed as a chi-square with three degrees of freedom.  When linear instrumental 
variables are used there is little evidence against the model specification for three of 
the five commodity categories (tomato, bean/pea, and broccoli/cauliflower).  For each 
of these three models the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test implies the model 
specification and choice of instruments cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.    
There is moderate evidence against the pepper model, which cannot be rejected at the 
7 percent level.  The onion model cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level – evidence 










Table 10: Parameter estimates with linear instruments 













Tomato         
1   0.538*** 0.070 0.519*** 0.073 0.506*** 0.076 0.494*** 0.079 
k  0.109 0.059 0.133 0.069 0.149 0.077 0.179 0.095 
q  0.020 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.020* 0.010 
  5.366 2.752 6.435 3.693 7.190 4.424 7.963 5.214 
J-stat 2.337  2.158  2.019  1.875  
p-value 0.505  0.540  0.568  0.599  
Pepper         
1   0.511*** 0.048 0.511*** 0.048 0.511*** 0.048 0.511*** 0.051 
k  0.177*** 0.025 0.176*** 0.024 0.175*** 0.023 0.163*** 0.016 
q  -0.500 0.970 -0.254 0.486 -0.131 0.246 -0.016 0.024 
  -0.355 0.726 -0.698 1.406 -1.345 2.642 -10.417 15.335 
J-stat 6.948  6.952  6.960  7.058  
p-value 0.074  0.073  0.073  0.070  
Onion         
1   0.054*** 0.010 0.055*** 0.010 0.055*** 0.010 0.055*** 0.010 
k  0.036 0.104 0.023 0.109 0.007 0.153 -0.001 0.205 
q  0.072 0.091 0.079 0.154 0.102 0.397 0.114 0.581 
  0.543 1.314 0.371 1.490 0.224 1.599 0.187 1.623 
J-stat 13.029  13.014  12.995  12.989  
p-value 0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  
Beans/Peas         
1   0.191*** 0.034 0.192*** 0.034 0.195*** 0.033 0.206*** 0.030 
k  0.043 0.273 0.016 0.289 -0.029 0.313 -0.204 0.392 
q  -0.016 0.114 -0.003 0.059 0.003 0.032 0.008 0.010 
  -2.662 1.838 -5.071 3.457 -9.205 6.148 -26.230 16.315 
J-stat 2.986  2.868  2.710  2.434  
p-value 0.394  0.412  0.438  0.487  
Broccoli/Cauliflower 
1   0.089** 0.028 0.089** 0.029 0.088** 0.029 0.087** 0.030 
k  -0.193 0.275 -0.197 0.277 -0.206 0.282 -0.226 0.298 
q  0.277 0.573 0.155 0.315 0.094 0.185 0.057 0.107 
  -0.642 0.678 -1.170 1.229 -1.986 2.069 -3.404 3.469 
J-stat 0.346  0.343  0.338  0.329  
p-value 0.951  0.952  0.953  0.955  
Note: Standard errors computed by delta method; * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 






Weight on Domestic Producer Surplus 
When linear instruments are used, the weight on domestic producer surplus is 
significantly greater than one in all five of the commodity categories; again, evidence 
suggesting that border inspection protocols are implemented in a manner that protects 
domestic producers from import competition.  Once again, the estimated weight on 
domestic producer surplus is highest in the tomato and pepper categories, ranging 
from 1.49 to 1.54 in the tomato category and 1.51 in the pepper category. The weight 
on domestic producer surplus ranges from 1.19 to 1.21 in the bean/pea category and 
the weights on domestic producer surplus in the broccoli/cauliflower and onion 
categories are 1.09 and 1.06 respectively.  These estimates of the weight on domestic 
producer surplus are roughly equivalent to estimates using the nonlinear set of 
instruments, indicating that the estimation results are robust to alternative sets of 
instruments.   
 
Expected NIS Damage 
 Estimates of expected NIS damage per kilogram of inspected imports ( q ) 
are presented in Table 11.  These estimates indicate that expected damage per 
kilogram of inspected tomato imports range from $0.11 to $0.16.  Although 
insignificant at the 5 percent level, estimates of expected damage in the tomato 
category are statistically significant at least at the 8 percent level.  Expected damage 
per kilogram of inspected pepper imports are estimated with a higher degree of 
precision and range from $0.17 to $0.18, slightly higher than estimates obtained using 
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nonlinear instruments.  These estimates suggest that the inspection agency behaves as 
if expected damage per dollar of inspected pepper imports is approximately $0.05.  
For the remainder of the commodity categories, expected damage per kilogram of 
imports cannot be distinguished from zero.  These results are consistent with results 
obtained using nonlinear instruments.   
   
Table 11: Expected damage with linear instruments, $/kg imports ( q ) 













Tomato 0.109 0.059 0.131 0.068 0.146 0.075 0.161 0.083 
Pepper 0.177*** 0.024 0.177*** 0.024 0.176*** 0.022 0.165*** 0.017 
Onion 0.039 0.103 0.029 0.104 0.023 0.104 0.021 0.104 
Bean/Pea 0.044 0.275 0.016 0.290 -0.029 0.314 -0.204 0.392 
Broccoli/ 
Cauliflower 
-0.178 0.244 -0.181 0.242 -0.186 0.241 -0.195 0.238 
Note: * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes significance at 1% level; *** denotes significance 
at 0.1% level. 
 
5.2.3 Terms of Trade 
  In this section I evaluate the influence of terms of trade on inspection 
intensity.  As described in Chapter 3, the no terms of trade model is estimated by 
imposing an assumption that    .  The no terms of trade model is then compared 
to the terms of trade model (results presented in Table 8) on the basis of tests of the 
over-identifying restrictions imposed by the two models.  As an example, if the over-
identifying restrictions test presents strong evidence against the no terms of trade 
model and only weak evidence against the terms of trade model, this is interpreted as 
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evidence that terms of trade influence border inspections.  Results of the no terms of 
trade estimation are presented in Table 12.   
 
Table 12: Parameter estimates assuming no terms of trade 







Parameter Std Error Parameter
Std 
Error 
Tomato         
1   0.625*** 0.074 0.627*** 0.074 0.627*** 0.074 0.628*** 0.074 
k  -0.010 0.053 -0.010 0.053 -0.010 0.054 -0.013 0.062 
q  -0.003 0.018 -0.003 0.017 -0.003 0.017 -0.003 0.017 
  3.374 3.194 3.440 3.268 3.474 3.307 3.505 3.337 
J-stat 3.639  3.632  3.628  3.626  
p-value 0.303  0.304  0.305  0.305  
Pepper         
1   1.052 1.103 0.917 1.144 0.691 1.157 -1.287 1.321 
k  0.180 0.238 0.140 0.371 1.714 966.109 -0.004 0.026 
q  -0.092 0.321 -0.082 0.564 3.046 1852.172 0.000 0.002 
  -2.316 9.935 -2.245 17.581 0.045 27.593 88.793 56.840 
J-stat 6.534  7.109  8.148  8.657  
p-value 0.088  0.069  0.043  0.034  
Onion         
1   0.012* 0.006 0.012* 0.006 0.012* 0.006 0.012* 0.006 
k  -0.038 0.430 -0.061 0.612 -0.104 0.983 -0.125 1.170 
q  0.043 0.449 0.039 0.370 0.037 0.332 0.037 0.325 
  -0.283 1.439 -0.342 1.592 -0.380 1.682 -0.388 1.701 
J-stat 2.012  1.998  1.990  1.988  
p-value 0.570  0.573  0.574  0.575  
Beans/Peas         
1   -0.082 0.058 -0.080 0.058 -0.077 0.059 -0.069 0.066 
k  -0.395 0.674 -0.417 0.760 -0.467 0.943 -1.034 2.892 
q  0.957 2.538 0.536 1.438 0.329 0.901 0.170 0.509 
  -0.176 0.440 -0.308 0.764 -0.488 1.203 -0.885 2.254 
J-stat 0.022  0.030  0.044  0.099  
p-value 0.999  0.999  0.998  0.992  
Broccoli/Cauliflower 
1   0.090* 0.042 0.091* 0.043 0.092* 0.044 0.094* 0.046 
k  -0.490 0.367 -0.478 0.362 -0.456 0.352 -0.394 0.319 
q  -0.335* 0.169 -0.192 0.098 -0.120 0.062 -0.077 0.041 
  1.664 0.855 2.898 1.501 4.604 2.409 7.034 3.736 
J-stat 0.733  0.724  0.718  0.722  
p-value 0.865  0.868  0.869  0.868  
Note: Standard errors computed by delta method; * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 




The terms of trade version of the tomato model cannot be rejected at least at 
the 50 percent level, whereas the no terms of trade version cannot be rejected at 
approximately the 30 percent level.  Therefore, although both versions of the tomato 
model cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels, the evidence supporting 
specification of the terms of trade model is stronger than the evidence supporting the 
no terms of trade model.  The estimation results also indicate that the estimated 
weight on domestic producer surplus increases from approximately 1.48 in the terms 
of trade model to 1.63 in the no terms of trade tomato model.   
 As mentioned above, specification of the no terms of trade version of the 
pepper model cannot be rejected only at the 10 percent level.  On the other hand, 
specification of the terms of trade model cannot be rejected at least at the 50 percent 
level.  These statistical specification tests therefore support the terms of trade version 
of the model.  Also, when the terms of trade assumption is dropped, the point 
estimates of the weight on pepper producer surplus vary widely depending on the 
assumed trade cost due to inspections and are estimated with very little precision.  
Despite large estimates of the weight on producer welfare (both positive and 
negative), none of the estimates can be statistically distinguished from one.  In 
contrast, estimates of the weight on domestic producer surplus in the terms of trade 
model are precisely estimated and stable across different assumed trade costs.  
Overall, the statistical specification test and the precision of the parameter estimates 
provide strong evidence in favor of the terms of trade version of the pepper model. 
 In contrast to the pepper model, specification of the onion model improves in 
the no terms of trade version.  Specifically, the terms of trade version of the model 
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cannot be rejected at least at the 6 percent level, whereas the no terms of trade version 
of the onion model cannot be rejected at the 57 percent level.  With respect to the 
weight on domestic producer surplus, the parameter estimate falls from 1.05 in the 
terms of trade version of the model to 1.01 in the no terms of trade version of the 
model.  Although both estimates of the producer welfare weight are relatively low, 
they are both statistically distinguishable from one.  There is therefore strong 
evidence supporting the no terms of trade version of the onion model as well as 
evidence (in both versions of the model) that the welfare weight on domestic onion 
producers is very close to one.   
 There is strong evidence supporting both specifications of the bean/pea model.  
In fact, distinguishing the two versions of the bean/pea model on the basis of model 
specification tests is difficult.  In the terms of trade version of the model, the weight 
on domestic producer surplus was estimated at approximately 1.22 and significantly 
greater than one.  In the no terms of trade version, the estimated weight is 
approximately 0.92 but cannot be statistically distinguished from one.  Although 
imprecisely estimated, the remaining parameter estimates are the correct sign and of 
plausible magnitudes in the terms of trade version of the model.  In the no terms of 
trade version of the model, estimates of the cost of inspection effort and expected 
damage are negative and estimates of the expected infection rate are quite high.  
Therefore, although the two versions of the bean/pea model cannot be distinguished 
on the basis of statistical specification tests, the behavioral implications of the 
parameter estimates support the terms of trade version of the model.   
 119 
 
 Similar to the tomato and the bean/pea models, the broccoli/cauliflower model 
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels in both the terms of trade and 
the no terms of trade versions of the model.  As in the tomato model the specification 
test does support the terms of trade assumption.  The terms of trade model cannot be 
rejected at the 98 percent level, whereas the non terms of trade model cannot be 
rejected at the 87 percent level.  Estimates of the weight on domestic producer surplus 
are significantly greater than one in both models and stable across all assumed trade 
costs due to inspections.  Note that there is little difference in the estimated weight on 
producer welfare: in the terms of trade model the estimated weight is 1.14 (not 
statistically distinguishable from one) and in the no terms of trade model the 
estimated weight is 1.09.  Overall, there is weak evidence in support of the terms of 
trade model and the estimated weight on domestic producer is robust to the terms of 
trade assumption (although more precisely estimated in the no terms of trade model). 
    
5.2.4 Seasonal Heterogeneity 
In this section I address potential heterogeneity in the expected infection rate 
and marginal damages within a commodity category across seasons.  Expected 
damage may vary across seasons for a number of reasons.  If the mix of exporters 
varies through the course of a year, expected infection rates may differ due to 
variation in background pest infestation levels or the stringency of phytosanitary 
controls across exporters.25  Also, depending on the port of entry and final destination 
of imported goods, expected NIS damage may vary across seasons due to increased 
                                                 
25 Costello et al. (2007) demonstrate that risk of aquatic invasions into the San Francisco Bay varies by 
regional trading partners.   
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pest establishment potential in summer months as compared to winter months, 
particularly in northern US states.   
Despite these concerns, seasonal heterogeneity in expected infection rates and 
NIS damage is expected to be low.  Expected damage is a function of the type and the 
potential diversity of NIS arrivals as well as the likelihood of establishment after 
introduction.  APHIS determines establishment risk based on the presence and 
susceptibility of hosts as well as the presence and duration of climatic conditions 
suitable for establishment (Sequeira, Millar, and Bartels 2001).  As an example, one 
pest of current regulatory concern is the Mexfly which is distributed throughout 
Mexico, Central America, and South America.  Due to year-round presence of 
susceptible hosts and the absence of winter conditions that otherwise prevent 
establishment, the southern US is considered the only high-risk establishment region 
in the US (Sequeira, Millar, and Bartels 2001).26   
As is shown in Table 13, over 95 percent of bean/pea, pepper, and tomato 
inspected imports enter through southern ports and over 90 percent of 
broccoli/cauliflower and onion inspected imports enter through southern ports.  Since 
susceptible hosts are present in the southern states year-round, it is assumed that 
heterogeneity in expected damages across seasons is low for the set of commodities 




                                                 
26 Similarly, a separate analysis of the establishment potential of fruit fly finds that cold weather 
exclusion areas prevent establishment in most of the US, with the exception of the Southern states 
(Margosian et al. ND). 
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Bean/Pea Onion Pepper Tomato 
Arizona s 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.57 
California s 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.27 
Colorado     0.00 0.00 
Delaware  0.01 0.00 0.00   
Florida s 0.03 0.46 0.09 0.01 0.00 
Georgia s 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Idaho  0.00 0.00 0.00   
Illinois  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Indiana  0.00 0.00 0.00   
Kentucky    0.00   
Louisiana s 0.00     
Massachusetts  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Maryland   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Michigan  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.01 
Minnesota     0.00  
Mississippi s    0.00  
Montana  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
North Carolina   0.00  0.00  
North Dakota  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 
New Mexico s   0.00 0.13 0.00 
Nevada    0.00   
New York  0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Ohio     0.00 0.00 
Oregon     0.00 0.00 
Pennsylvania   0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Rhode Island  0.00  0.00   
South Carolina s   0.01   
Tennessee   0.00  0.00  
Texas s 0.53 0.06 0.32 0.16 0.14 
Virginia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vermont  0.00   0.00 0.00 
Washington  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Southern port share  0.93 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.99 
* Note: ‘s’ denotes southern state 
 
The monthly share of inspected imports, broken down by geographic region of 
origin, is presented in Table 14.  The inspected import mix stays relatively constant 
throughout the year for the tomato, pepper, and broccoli/cauliflower categories.  The 
inspected import mix for the bean/pea category varies through the course of the year 
primarily due to an increase in inspected imports from South America for the months 
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July through November.  Inspected onion import shares vary throughout the year, 
divided among Mexico, South America, Central America, and an aggregate of other 
regions.  
 
Table 14: Inspected import shares by geographic region of origin and month 
Commodity Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Broccoli/ 
Cauliflower 
C. America 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 
 Mexico 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.98 
 Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 S. America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Bean/Pea C. America 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.27 0.30 0.32 
 Mexico 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.27 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.50 0.66 
 Other 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 S. America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.31 0.47 0.18 0.01 
Onion C. America 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 Mexico 0.14 0.25 0.43 0.35 0.57 0.79 0.68 0.37 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.13 
 Other 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.15 0.25 0.48 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.16 
 S. America 0.65 0.45 0.18 0.33 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.52 0.62 0.57 0.66 
Pepper C. America 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 Mexico 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.91 
 Other 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.09 
 S. America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tomato C. America   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Mexico 0.86 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.95 
 Other 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.05 




In order to allow for seasonality in expected NIS damage and expected 
infection rates the terms of trade model is estimated allowing the parameters 





  to vary across the summer and winter seasons.  Additional moment 
conditions are constructed by interacting the nonlinear instrumental variables with 
seasonal dummy variables.  I test for the presence of seasonality based on a null 
hypothesis that the parameter estimates of expected NIS damage per kilogram of 
inspected imports are equal across the summer and winter seasons Summer Winterq q  .  
Outcomes of these hypotheses tests are presented in Table 15.27   
 
Table 15: Tests of equality of seasonal parameters 0 Summer Winter:H q q   














Tomato 1.282 0.258 1.122 0.290 1.101 0.294 1.039 0.308 
Pepper 7.983 0.005 7.724 0.005 7.261 0.007 3.606 0.058 
Onion 17.125 0.000 17.323 0.000 17.181 0.000 17.104 0.000 
Bean/pea 4.257 0.039 3.808 0.051 3.118 0.077 1.121 0.290 
Broccoli/ 
Cauliflower 
0.659 0.417 0.747 0.387 0.911 0.340 18.331 0.000 
 
There is strong evidence suggesting that expected NIS damage varies across 
season for the pepper and onion categories.  In the pepper category, the hypothesis 
that expected NIS damage varies across season can be rejected at least at the 10 
                                                 
27 The test statistics are distributed as  2 1 . 
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percent level across all assumed trade costs.  In the onion category, there is strong 
evidence suggesting seasonal heterogeneity no matter what assumption is made about 
trade costs due to inspections.  There is little evidence to suggest that expected NIS 
damage varies across season in the tomato category.  This result holds irrespective of 
assumed trade costs due to inspections.  There is weak evidence that expected damage 
varies across season in the broccoli/cauliflower categories and somewhat stronger 
evidence of seasonality in the bean/pea category.   
In Table 16 I present parameter estimates for the weight on domestic producer 
surplus and expected NIS damage per kilogram of inspected imports for the summer 
and winter seasons for each commodity category.  Note that the over-identifying 
restriction tests present little evidence against the seasonal heterogeneity 
specifications of the tomato, pepper, onion, and bean/pea models and the evidence 
against the seasonal heterogeneity specification the broccoli/cauliflower model is 
moderate.28   
 First, note that the estimated weights on domestic producer surplus in the 
tomato and pepper categories reported in Table 16 – between 1.45 and 1.53 in the 
tomato category and between 1.61 and 1.63 in the pepper category – are roughly the 
same as the estimates reported in Table 8.  The estimated weight on domestic 
producer surplus in the onion category is estimated to range from 1.04 to 1.05 in the 
estimations allowing for seasonality.  This compares to an estimate of approximately 
1.05 with no seasonal heterogeneity.   
 
                                                 
28 The model allowing for seasonal heterogeneity has fourteen moment conditions and seven 
parameters, leaving seven orthogonality restrictions that are used to test the model specification. 
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Table 16: Parameter estimates allowing for seasonal heterogeneity 













Tomato         
1   0.532* 0.234 0.469* 0.222 0.459* 0.222 0.445* 0.222 
Summerq  0.061 0.177 0.107 0.167 0.118 0.168 0.131 0.168 
Winterq  0.164 0.112 0.199 0.108 0.209 0.109 0.220 0.111 
J-stat 7.252  4.246  3.991  3.738  
p-value 0.403  0.751  0.781  0.809  
Pepper         
1   0.613*** 0.055 0.613*** 0.055 0.614*** 0.055 0.625*** 0.059 
Summerq  0.025 0.056 0.026 0.057 0.027 0.058 0.041 0.068 
Winterq  0.182*** 0.011 0.182*** 0.011 0.182*** 0.011 0.173*** 0.012 
J-stat 4.034  4.029  4.021  3.823  
p-value 0.776  0.776  0.777  0.800  
Onion         
1   0.044*** 0.006 0.044*** 0.006 0.045*** 0.006 0.045*** 0.006 
Summerq  0.058 0.078 0.054 0.078 0.052 0.078 0.052 0.078 
Winterq  0.363*** 0.041 0.358*** 0.040 0.354*** 0.040 0.353*** 0.040 
J-stat 11.148  10.981  10.913  10.906  
p-value 0.132  0.139  0.142  0.143  
Bean/pea         
1   0.030 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.033 
Summerq  -0.220 0.290 -0.197 0.297 -0.157 0.310 0.030 0.369 
Winterq  0.428*** 0.035 0.429*** 0.035 0.430*** 0.035 0.441*** 0.033 
J-stat 5.125  5.111  5.101  5.320  
p-value 0.645  0.646  0.648  0.621  
Broccoli/Cauliflower 
1   0.020** 0.008 0.021** 0.008 0.021** 0.008 0.021** 0.008 
Summerq  0.495*** 0.031 0.494*** 0.030 0.493*** 0.029 0.503*** 0.031 
Winterq  0.456*** 0.046 0.451*** 0.047 0.444*** 0.047 0.214*** 0.058 
J-stat 14.234  14.251  14.259  10.595  
p-value 0.047  0.047  0.047  0.157  
Note: Standard errors computed by delta method; * denotes significance at 5% level; ** denotes 
significance at 1% level; *** denotes significance at 0.1% level. 
 
When seasonal heterogeneity is allowed, the estimated producer welfare 
weight in the bean/pea category is approximately 1.03 and cannot be statistically 
distinguished from one.  This contrasts with the results of the specification that does 
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not allow for seasonal heterogeneity; as reported in Table 8 the estimated weight on 
domestic producer surplus is approximately 1.22.  The weight on domestic producer 
surplus in the broccoli/cauliflower model is estimated at 1.02 when seasonal 
heterogeneity is allowed.  Although small – compared to the estimated weight of 1.14 
with no seasonal –heterogenetiy – the estimated weight of 1.02 is statistically greater 
than one.  Once again, note that there is moderate evidence against the 
broccoli/cauliflower model when seasonality is allowed.    
Taking seasonal heterogeneity into account, estimated NIS damage due to 
pepper imports cannot be distinguished from zero in the summer, whereas in the 
winter, estimated damage is $0.05 per dollar of inspected pepper imports.  Expected 
damage due to inspected bean/pea imports cannot be distinguished from zero in the 
summer and is approximately $0.10 per dollar in the winter season.  The increase in 
expected NIS damage in the winter months corresponds to an increase in the share of 
inspected imports arriving from Mexico during the same period (see Table 14).  This 
may imply that expected damages due to import of winter season peppers and 
beans/peas from Mexico are higher.  Higher expected damage implied by inspection 
intensity may also reflect more intensive screening of winter season imports due to 
increased concern about competition from winter season imports.   
Expected damage due to onion imports cannot be distinguished from zero in 
the summer and is estimated at approximately $0.28 per dollar of imports in the 
winter season.  Expected damage associated with broccoli/cauliflower imports are 
roughly equivalent across months.  Assuming trade cost due to inspections are less 
than $0.30 pre kilogram, expected damages are estimated at approximately $0.26 per 
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dollar of inspected imports in both the summer and winter.  These estimates diverge 
when assumed trade cost due to inspections are greater than $0.60 per kilogram; in 
this case expected damage remains at approximately $0.26 per dollar of imports in the 
summer and decreases to approximately $0.11 per dollar of imports in the winter.  
Recall that the reduced form broccoli/cauliflower model indicated that the winter 
dummy variable was negative and statistically significant.  This is consistent with 
lower structural estimates of expected damage in the winter months. 
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presents estimation results for both reduced form and structural 
models of border inspection.  The terms of trade structural model is estimated using 
nonlinear instruments and the robustness of those results is confirmed by an 
estimation based on linear instruments.  In addition to the terms of trade model, two 
additional structural models are estimated corresponding to alternative behavioral 
assumptions.  First, in order to assess the impact of terms of trade on border 
inspections, the model is estimated with no terms of trade.  Second, due to potential 
seasonal heterogeneity in the expected infection rate and marginal damage, the terms 
of trade model is estimated allowing expected damages to vary by season. 
I find evidence that border inspection of tomato imports is implemented in a 
trade distorting manner, both with respect to the weight on domestic producer surplus 
and terms of trade.  I also find little evidence of seasonal heterogeneity in expected 
damage due to tomato imports.  The terms of trade model with no seasonal 
heterogeneity is therefore the preferred specification for tomatoes.  The implicit 
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weight on domestic producer surplus is significantly greater than one and implies a 
large premium is placed on domestic producer welfare relative to consumer welfare.  
The estimated welfare weight on domestic tomato producers is approximately 1.48, 
implying that domestic consumer welfare is valued at 68 percent of domestic 
producer welfare.  In addition to shifting surplus from consumers to producers, I also 
find that terms trade considerations influence border inspection of tomatoes.  This 
suggests that the inspection agency is able to offset the effect of inspections on 
domestic price by passing some of the cost of inspection through to the world price.  
Finally, I find that the inspection agency behaves as if expected damage ranges from 
$0.06 to $0.07 per dollar of inspected imports, independent of the season of entry.   
Since there is strong evidence against the no terms of trade model and 
evidence indicating seasonal heterogeneity, inspection of pepper imports is best 
characterized by the terms of trade model with seasonal heterogeneity.  In this model, 
the estimated welfare weight on domestic pepper producers is quite high, ranging 
from 1.61 to 1.63.  Similar to domestic tomato producers, US pepper producers are 
politically influential and, as mentioned earlier, have demonstrated an ability to 
influence trade policy in the past.  This is consistent with the high estimated welfare 
weights for these two commodities.  Once again, there is strong evidence against the 
no terms of trade version of the model, indicating that terms of trade factors do 
influence border inspection of pepper imports.  With respect to damages, I find that 
the inspection agency behaves as if expected damage is essentially zero in the 
summer and increases to $0.06 per dollar of imports in the winter.   
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In contrast to the previous two commodities, there is strong evidence against 
the terms of trade model for onions.  There is also strong evidence of seasonal 
heterogeneity in expected damages.  Further, the estimated welfare weight on 
domestic onion producers is low in all versions of the model, never exceeding 1.05.  
Overall, these results suggest that inspection of onion imports is not conducted in a 
trade distorting manner; there is evidence of a small implicit transfer from consumers 
to producers and terms of trade motives do not appear to influence inspections.  There 
is significant heterogeneity in expected damage across seasons.  Similar to peppers, I 
find that the inspection agency behaves as if expected damage is zero in the summer 
and increases to $0.29 per dollar of imports in the winter.  The difference in expected 
damage in the summer versus the winter months roughly corresponds to a shift in the 
source of imports from Mexico in the summer to Central American countries in the 
winter.  These results imply that onion imports from Central America are considered 
to be potentially more damaging than onion imports from Mexico. 
There is little evidence against the terms of trade model with no seasonality 
for the bean/pea category.  First, dropping terms of trade motives from the model 
does little to improve the specification.  Second, there is only weak evidence that 
damages vary by season.  In the terms of trade model with no seasonal heterogeneity, 
the weight on domestic producer surplus is significantly greater than one and is 
estimated to range from 1.21 to 1.23.  These results imply that border inspection of 
bean/pea imports is conducted in a trade distorting manner, both respect to 
protectionist and terms of trade motives.  Assuming no seasonal heterogeneity, I find 
that the inspection agency behaves as if expected damage is very close to zero.   
 130 
 
Finally, the terms of trade model with no seasonal heterogeneity best 
characterizes inspection of broccoli/cauliflower imports.  Although the estimate of the 
weight on domestic producer surplus is approximately 1.14, it is imprecisely 
estimated and cannot be statistically distinguished from one.  Therefore, aside from 
evidence that terms of trade influence inspections, there is little evidence that border 
inspection of broccoli/cauliflower imports is conducted in order to transfer surplus 
from consumers to producers.  As with bean/pea imports, I find that the inspection 
agency considers broccoli/cauliflower imports to be very low risk – estimate of 






Uncertain potential damages due to foreign pest and disease introductions, 
combined with a lack of transparency in enforcement, contribute to a perception that 
government agencies use biosecurity import restrictions as disguised barriers to trade.  
Recognizing this, international trade agreements prohibit the use of border 
inspections as arbitrary or unjustified barriers to trade.  However, despite the 
perception that enforcement of biosecurity import restriction may be used as a 
disguised trade barrier, there is little systematic empirical analysis distinguishing 
genuine attempts to protect against foreign pest and disease introductions from 
attempts to distort trade.   
In this dissertation I examine the extent to which border inspections for NIS 
are used as a distortionary trade barrier.  I begin by developing a theoretical model of 
optimal border inspection intensity by a government agency with a mandate to screen 
imports to prevent unintentional NIS introductions.  Optimal inspection intensity 
trades off avoided NIS damage with the impact of border inspections on prices, and 
as a consequence on domestic producer and consumer surplus.  I use the theoretical 
model to specify an econometric model of US agricultural border inspections for NIS.  
The econometric model is used to test the degree to which border inspections are used 
as a distortionary barrier to trade – both to protect domestic producers from import 
competition as well as to influence terms of trade – and to determine the levels of 
expected damage implied by the stringency of border inspections. 
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The theoretical model builds on the existing literature in a number of ways.  I 
incorporate a politically influential domestic production sector and relax the small 
country assumption imposed by prior border inspection models.  I assume detected 
imports are treated rather than destroyed – an assumption that is consistent with US 
agricultural border inspections.  I also introduce a more general specification of the 
detection rate as a function of inspection intensity and the expected infection rate.  
Two cases are considered in the theoretical analysis.  First, I consider the case where 
the optimal tariff and optimal inspection intensity are set jointly.  Second, I consider 
the case where the tariff is predetermined as a result of constraints imposed by trade 
agreements.   
When the government has the option of setting an optimal tariff, I show that 
inspection intensity is independent of the weight on domestic producer surplus.  In 
this case the government prefers to use import tariffs to achieve its distributional 
objectives.  When both instruments are set jointly, I show that an increase in the 
marginal cost due to border inspection, including both the cost of conducting 
inspections as well as trade costs due to inspections, will decrease optimal inspection 
intensity; an increase in marginal expected damage due to admitted NIS increases 
optimal inspection intensity; and an increase in the cost of treating detected imports, 
which reduces the marginal net benefit of inspections, decreases optimal inspection 
intensity.  Finally, when the expected infection rate increases, the inspection agency 
may prefer to inspect imports more or less intensively.  Prior models of border 
inspection also find an ambiguous relationship between inspection intensity and the 
infection rate.  However, in these models this result is due to the assumption that 
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detected imports are destroyed.  When detected imports are treated, I show that the 
ambiguous relationship between inspection intensity and the infection rate is due to 
the more general specification of the detection rate I introduce.   
Empirically, the tariff is likely constrained by trade agreements.  For example, 
the US has entered into a number of free trade agreements with countries that export 
fruit and vegetables to the US.  These include multilateral trade agreements, such as 
NAFTA, the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Agreement, and a number of 
bilateral agreements with countries such as Australia, Chile, and Peru.  The tariff 
applied to fresh fruit and vegetable imports from these trading partners is zero and 
therefore too low from a political economy, terms of trade, and NIS perspective.  In 
the case where the predetermined tariff is set lower than optimal I show that the 
inspection agency prefers to inspect imports more intensively relative to the first best 
level of inspection intensity. 
When the tariff is predetermined, an increase in the weight on domestic 
producer surplus increases optimal inspection intensity.  Optimal inspection intensity 
also increases in response to an increase in expected damage.  This implies that the 
inspection agency prefers to inspect imports more intensively in response to both an 
increase in the weight on domestic producer surplus and an increase in expected 
damage.  The response of optimal inspection intensity to the cost of treating detected 
imports is less straightforward.  When the tariff is predetermined, an increase in the 
cost of treating detected imports no longer strictly reduces the marginal net benefit of 
inspections.  Rather, an increase in the cost of treating detected imports increases the 
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responsiveness of domestic price to inspection intensity.  As a consequence, border 
inspections become a more effective instrument in terms of transferring surplus from 
consumers to producers, and an increase in the cost of treatment may lead to an 
increase in optimal border inspection intensity.  This is more likely to occur if the 
predetermined tariff is lower than the optimal tariff.  As was the case when the tariff 
was set optimally, if the tariff is predetermined, inspection intensity may increase or 
decrease due to an increase in the expected infection rate.   
The empirical component of this dissertation examines the extent to which US 
agricultural border inspections for NIS are conducted in a trade distorting manner.  I 
use the theoretical model to specify reduced form and structural models of optimal 
border inspection.  The models are estimated using a dataset that documents the 
outcome of US agricultural border inspections for NIS, combined with publicly 
available data on weekly import volumes, domestic production volumes, the domestic 
prices of imports, and import tariffs.  Separate models are estimated for five vegetable 
commodities imported into the US, including tomatoes, peppers, onions, beans/peas, 
and broccoli/cauliflower.   
The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to quantify the implied weight 
the inspection agency places on domestic producer welfare relative to other 
components of social welfare.  The welfare weight on domestic tomato and pepper 
producers is of particular interest due to anecdotal evidence suggesting that these are 
politically powerful producer groups.  US fruit and vegetable growers opposed 
NAFTA due to a concern that the removal of seasonal import tariffs would force them 
to compete with increased fruit and vegetable imports from Mexico.  Fruit and 
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vegetable growers pushed for longer transition periods and protection from import 
surges.  As a part of NAFTA implementation, US tomato and pepper imports from 
Mexico were monitored for evidence of import surges through to January 2009.   
I find evidence suggesting that border inspection protocols are conducted in a 
trade distorting manner.  The reduced form analysis suggests that the weight on 
domestic producer surplus is greater than one and the estimated weight on domestic 
producer surplus in the structural analysis ranges from 1 to 1.63.  The structural 
results imply that the welfare of domestic consumers is valued from 61 to 100 percent 
of domestic producer welfare.  The implied weights on domestic producer surplus are 
highest in the tomato and pepper categories, estimated to range from 1.48 to 1.5 for 
tomatoes and from 1.61 to 1.63 for peppers.  The estimated welfare weight is 
approximately 1.22 on bean/pea growers, less than 1.05 on domestic onion growers, 
and the estimated weight on broccoli/cauliflower growers cannot be distinguished 
from one.  Overall, the results of the structural model suggest that the weight on 
domestic producers is never less than one, is greater than one in the majority of 
commodities in this analysis, and in some cases is quite large. 
I also find evidence that terms of trade motives influence border inspection of 
a number of the commodities in the analysis.  The influence of terms of trade is tested 
based on a comparison of the over-identifying assumptions imposed by two 
competing models of border inspection: the terms of trade and the no terms trade 
versions of the model.  Based on this comparison, I find evidence in favor of the 
terms of trade version of the tomato and pepper models, implying terms of trade 
considerations influence tomato and pepper imports.  I also find evidence suggesting 
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that inspection of bean/pea and broccoli/cauliflower imports is conducted to influence 
terms of trade.  I find that inspection of onion imports do not respond to terms of 
trade considerations.  Overall, the evidence suggests that terms of trade do influence 
border inspections, implying that the US takes advantage of its market power when 
inspecting vegetable imports. 
The structural analysis also quantifies the inspection agency’s implied 
expectation of NIS damage.  I find that the inspection agency behaves as if expected 
NIS damage ranges from $0 to more than $0.25 per dollar of inspected imports 
depending on commodity and season of import.  Estimated damage due to tomato 
imports is constant throughout the year and is estimated at $0.07 per dollar of 
imports.  I find evidence of seasonal variation in expected damage for some 
commodities including peppers and onions; in these cases damages are higher in the 
winter months.  With respect to bean/pea and broccoli/cauliflower imports, I find that 
the inspection agency behaves as if damage due to these imports is very low.  The 
highest estimates of expected damage are associated with onion, pepper, and tomato 
imports.  This is consistent with the relatively high annual domestic production value 
of these commodities, as well as the political profile of domestic tomato and pepper 
growers.   
This dissertation contributes to the literature on trade and the environment.  I 
provide empirical evidence that an environmental policy is used in a trade-distorting 
manner, both to protect domestic producers from import competition as well as 
influence terms of trade.  Although there is an extensive theoretical literature 
addressing the use of environmental policy as a substitute for trade policy, there is 
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little supporting empirical evidence (Copeland and Taylor 2004 survey this 
literature).  This dissertation is the first to estimate welfare weights implied by 
enforcement of an environmentally motivated import standard.  Prior empirical 
analyses of trade policy have estimated welfare weights associated with policies 
explicitly implemented to protect domestic producers from import competition.  This 
dissertation examines enforcement of an import standard implemented to address an 
environmental externality, but conducted in a trade distorting manner.   
A number of previous studies, specifically Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and 
Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000), examine the formation of non-tariff barriers 
and estimate welfare weights implied by these barriers.  These analyses estimate 
structural parameters using aggregated measures of the stringency of non-tariff 
barriers based on theoretical models of tariff formation.  As presented in the 
theoretical chapter of this dissertation, the predictions of a model of tariff formation 
do not necessarily carry over to models of non-tariff barriers.  Empirically, I show 
that it is difficult to derive a priori predictions from a reduced form model of border 
inspections.  I also find that the results of the reduced form analysis imply a lower 
weight on domestic producer surplus as compared to the results of the structural 
analysis.  The weak connection between theory and empirics in the Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999) and the Bandyopadhyay and Gawande (2000) analyses may explain the 
relatively low estimates of producer welfare weights obtained in these studies.   
There are a number of potential extensions of this dissertation research.  The 
current analysis assumed that border inspections were conducted irrespective of the 
country or the region of origin of the trading partner.  The empirical analysis can be 
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extended to test for systematic differences in the application of US trade policy by 
tradeing partner, either on the basis of region or on the basis of membership in 
preferential trade agreements with the US.  In future work the empirical framework 
developed in this dissertation can be extended to studies of border inspection 
protocols implemented to ensure the safety of food and consumer good imports.  
Also, an alternative to conducting inspections at the border is greater reliance on pre-
clearance programs that move inspection to the point of production.  Currently, there 
is little information on the efficacy of pre-clearance programs (Meilke, Rude, and 
Zahniser 2008).  There is also little information on the trade costs associated with 
border inspections due to delay and risk of rejection at the border.  Future research 
assessing trade costs due to border inspections, as well as the efficacy and potential 
cost savings of pre-clearance programs, is clearly needed. 
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The equilibrium price arbitrage and materials balance conditions determine domestic 
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Tariff Rate and Inspection Intensity Set Simultaneously: 
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Second order sufficient conditions: 
 
(A.2.3)
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Differentiating (A.2.2) with respect to the tariff rate yields: 
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The condition for joint concavity of the objective function is derived using (A.2.4) 
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Comparative Static Results: 
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Expected NIS Damage: 
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Marginal Treatment Cost: 
 
(A.2.21) 
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Inspection Intensity Set Independently (Predetermined Tariff Rate): 
 
First Order Necessary Condition: 
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Second Order Sufficient Condition: 
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Weight on Domestic Producer Surplus: 
 
(A.3.4) 
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Expected NIS Damage: 
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Marginal treatment cost: 
 
(A.3.7)
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APPENDIX B: PPQ 280 Disposition Codes 
 
DISPOSITION 
CODES  Definition of code:  
CCNA  
Cargo Clearance, No Action - Regulated Product released based solely 
on review of entry documents or verification of temperature logs. 
Shipment was not held for further inspection. This does not include BCR 
or NCR shipments. Example: Litchi from China undergoing Cold 
Treatment while in transit to the U.S. and no inspection was required.  
CTPT  Cold Treatment, Precautionary Treatment – The product was sent to a 
cold-treatment facility in U.S. to undergo cold treatment to meet entry 
requirements.  
DEAP  Destroyed, Actionable Pest - Product destroyed because an actionable 
pest was found on, in, or with the product.  
DEAR  Destroyed Actionable Pest on NARP - The commodity on the NARP 
list was destroyed because the product was infested with an actionable 
pest. The destruction was the resulted of a NARP commodity selected for 
an intensive inspection resulting in the pest being found. Use DEAP if the 
commodity was commingled with non-NARP commodities.  
DECC  Destroyed, Carrier Contamination - Product destroyed because of 
container contamination with non-enterable products such as citrus 
leaves, soil, blood, or noxious weed seeds.  
DEPC  Destroyed, Product Contamination - Destroyed because product was 
contaminated with another non-enterable product such as citrus leaves, 
soil, blood, or noxious weed seeds on the product.  
DEPD  
Destroyed, Phyto Discrepancy - Commodity destroyed due to 
discrepancy on the phytosanitary certificate. For example, a discrepancy 
may be defined as wrong commodity, quantity, weight, or lack of a phyto 
or Additional Declaration  
DEPP  Destroyed, Prohibited Product - Commodity was destroyed because it 
was prohibited from entering the U.S.  
DPRP  Departmental Permit, Restricted Prohibited - Product restricted or 
prohibited entering in accordance with a Departmental Permit. These 
usually are samples going for testing.  
ENPE  Entered, Post Entry - Product entered under Post-entry requirements. 
These are live plants requiring quarantine upon entry for two years.  
ESRC  Endangered Species, Rescue Center – CITES plants that are seized and 
sent to an approved rescue center.  
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FUAP  Fumigated, Actionable Pest - Product was fumigated because an 
actionable pest was found associated with the product.  
FUAR  Fumigated Actionable Pest on NARP – The commodity on the NARP 
list was fumigated because the product was infested with an actionable 
pest. This fumigation was the resulted of a NARP commodity selected 
for an intensive inspection resulting in the pest being found. Use FUAP if 
the commodity was commingled with non-NARP commodities.  
FUCC  Fumigated, Carrier Contamination - Product was fumigated because 
of container contamination.  
FUPC  Fumigated, Product Contamination - Product was fumigated because 
of product contamination such as soil.  
FUPQ  Fumigated Precautionary - Fumigated a potential quarantine pest that 
was fumigated before final determination of the pest. (For other 
treatments use OTPQ.)  
FUPT  Fumigated, Precautionary Treatment – As a condition of entry product 
was fumigated as a precautionary treatment to meet entry requirements.  
IEND  Immediate Export, No Diversions – Product failed to make entry 
requirements of the US and the shipment was allowed to be exported to 
another country. Example: Product was shipped from Turkey and did not 
meet U.S. requirements. Shipper requested product be shipped to Canada. 
IRBC  Inspected and Released, Border Cargo - Agricultural product on the 
line release program or BRASS program was randomly inspected and 
released.  
IRAR  
Inspected and Release Agriculture Release (NARP) - Inspected and 
Released Agriculture Release (Program): NARP shipments that have 
been inspected and found in compliance of all regulations.  
IRMR  Inspected and Released, Meets Requirements – Product was released 
after a physical inspection of the commodity revealed no pest or 
contaminates of quarantine significance. Include cold treated transit 
commodities that are inspected upon entry into the U.S.  
IRPD  Inspected and Released, Phyto Discrepancy - Commodity inspected 
and released after discrepancy on the phytosanitary certificate has been 
reconciled to meet U.S. entry requirements. For example, a discrepancy 
may be defined as wrong commodity, quantity, weight, or lack of a phyto 
or Additional Declaration (AD). A reconciled phyto would include a 
superseded phyto to correct such items as an AD, quantity, etc. Also a 
new phyto may be issued by the exporting country to cover the shipment. 
The shipment would be held pending a superseded or new phyto, but the 
inspection was performed to enter U.S. commerce.  
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OTAP  Other Action Taken, Actionable Pest – The actions taken on the 
commodity were approved methods to destroy the pest other than 
fumigation. Examples would include hot water dips, heat treatments, 
grinding, or irradiation. The commodity is allowed to enter U.S. 
commerce after the treatment is complete.  
OTAR  Other Action Taken on NARP - The commodity on the NARP list had 
other remedial actions taken. The remedial action was the resulted of a 
NARP commodity selected for an intensive inspection resulting 
precautionary treatment for a pest, carrier, or contamination with a pest. 
The remedial action of cleaning, reconditioning, use of non-fumigants, 
etc… resulted in the commodity meeting the entry requirements of the 
United States. Use the “OT _ _” codes if the commodity was commingled 
with non-NARP commodities.  
OTCC  Other Action Taken, Carrier Contamination - Action taken on 
product because of carrier contamination. Pest-free product was 
transferred, cleaned, and allowed to enter the U.S. commerce. Mostly 
used at land border locations. Examples include the following: 
Containers or trucks with noxious weeds, soil, manure, straw, etc. were 
steam cleaned or transferred to a clean carrier.  
OTPC  
Other Action Taken, Product Contamination - Action taken on 
product because of product contamination. Product was cleaned and 
allowed to enter the U.S. commerce. Example: Citrus leaves were 
removed from a shipment of limes.  
OTPP  
Other Action Taken, Prohibited Product – Other action taken on 
product because it was prohibited from entering the U.S.  
OTPQ  
Other Action taken Precautionary – Any treatment other than 
fumigated use when a potential quarantine pest is found and the final 
determination has not yet been met.  
OTPT  
Other Action Taken, Precautionary Treatment - Other treatment not 
fumigation that are required as condition of entry used on products 
not requiring cold-treatment or fumigation. Other treatments may include 
heat-treatments on such commodities as Niger seed, or dips on certain 
plants to make them enterable into U.S. commerce. These would include 
mandatory treatments upon entry into the U.S.  
PCNA  Pre-cleared, No Action – Product was inspected and released for U.S. 
commerce in another country. No further inspections were preformed on 
the shipment upon entry into the U.S. Example would be Chilean grapes 
inspected before it departed the country of origin.  
PCIR  Pre-cleared, Inspected and Release - Product was inspected and 
released for U.S. commerce in another country. Upon entry into the U.S., 
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the product was randomly inspected at port of entry to monitor the pre-
clearance program or to conform to pre-clearance protocols. 
REAR  
Released Agriculture Release program (NARP): NARP shipments that 
entered the country under the NARP Program and were not inspected.  
REBC  
Released, Border Cargo Release Program - Agricultural product on the 
line release program or BRASS program was released without inspection 
at the port of entry.  
RXAP  Returned, Actionable Pest - Product re-exported to the country of origin 
because an actionable pest was found on the product.  
RXAR  
Returned Actionable Pest on NARP – The commodity on the NARP 
list was returned back to the country of origin because the product was 
infested with an actionable pest. The re-exportation was the resulted of a 
NARP commodity selected for an intensive inspection resulting in the 
pest being found. Use RXAP if the commodity was commingled with 
non-NARP commodities.  
RXCC  
Returned, Carrier Contamination – Product and carrier re-exported to 
the country of origin because of carrier contamination. Used mostly at 
land border locations. These shipments consist of containers or trucks 
with prohibited noxious weeds, blood, soil, manure, straw, etc. re-
exported to the country of origin.  
RXPC  Returned, Product Contamination - Product was re-exported back to 
another country because of product contamination with non-enterable 
products such as citrus leaves, soil, manure, or noxious weeds.  
RXPD  
Returned, Phyto Discrepancy - Commodity re-exported the country of 
origin due to discrepancy on the phytosanitary certificate. For example, a 
discrepancy may be defined as wrong commodity, quantity, weight, or 
lack of a phyto or Additional Declaration (AD).  
RXPP  Returned, Prohibited Product - Product was re-exported to the country 
of origin. Commodity was not approved for entry into the U.S.  
RXPQ  Returned Precautionary – Any shipment where importer opts no re-
export based on potential quarantine pest prior to final ID.  
RXWP  
Returned - Wood Packaging Material Violation: returned violation in 
ISPM15.  
TEOC  Transit and Export, Other Country - Product makes entry, only to 
transit under CBP in-bond (7512) to another U.S. port before it is 
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